The republican approach: rectification vs. retributivism and utilitarianism

The theory of rectification
The republican approach of penal law shares with utilitarianism its goal-oriented character, but the former has retributivist features as well.  Can the "rectification"  theory be positioned somewhere in between and what are the advantages?

Pettit and Braithwaite seek to find a theory that promotes personal dominion, a concept of republican liberty. Among some of the topical issues are what procedures should be followed in prosecution and adjudication and what sentences should be imposed for given offences. Any initiative taken in one part of the criminal system affects other parts of the system, thus creating "just deserts".

Retributivists have criticized that on the rectification approach, much like other goal-oriented or consequentialist theories like utilism/ utilitarianism, "A court is provided with a licence (to forward-looking and try to optimise results) to neglect the nature of the offence to which the sentence is meant to be a response."

Two notions of republican liberty
The 19th century notion of liberty was one of being free to enjoy a status constituted by protection and recognition of the law. This republican idea of liberty has evolved into thinking that freedom would be compromised by any interference, be it by protective law: as an isolated individual, one should enjoy perfect freedom [how realistic is this kind of thinking? In our contemporary world, few people live entirely separated from some sort of community].

Pettit and Braithwaite argue that the ideal of dominion, however, should be understood as "that non-interference should be enjoyed, not just a matter of contingent luck [ a kind of thinking reminiscent of Mill, M.Bouter], but in virtue of the protection of the law. Second, that it be salient to everyone in society, that the non-interference involved is of this resilient or secure character."

Important to note is that "Someone who enjoys non-interference, but does not do so resiliently, lives at the mercy of those who might choose to interfere."  Pettit and Braithwaite could not be any more clear. Those who enjoy freedom from any interference by government, seem perfectly free, until others, similarly free from interference by (penal) laws, disrupt their liberty.

Crime as a denial of dominion
In republican theory, Pettit and Braithwaite describe crime as "denial of dominion". "Crime will always involve a negative challenge to the dominion status of the victim and to the dispensation of dominion as it exists in the community at large. Dominion is a good whose enjoyment by anyone is highly sensitive to evidence of its enjoyment by others." The authors point out that the denial of a person's dominion involves both the flouting (nullifying) of his status as a citizen protected and the destroyal of the victim's dominion.

The elements of rectification: recognition, recompense, reassuration
Thirst, the autors propose certain conditions in order to apply their theory of rectification:
"Given that crime represents a sort of damage to dominion, given that the damage is partly remediable and given that the task of the system is to promote dominion, the sentencing job of the courts is to try to rectify the damage caused by crime."

The elements of rectification are now presented: "In sentencing the convicted criminal, courts ought to seek recognition by the offender of the dominion status of the victim, recompense by the offender for the damage done and reassurance to community of a kind that may undo the negative impact of crime on their dominion."

Recognition by the offender of the dominion status of its victim alone is not enough: apologies for the act inflicted are just words. Although Pettit and Braithwaite discuss rectification in practice, it does not become clear which requirements have to be met. However, the authors do recognize that perfect rectification is not realistic.

Comparing the republican approach of rectification with utilitarianism (consequentialism)
To point out some of the traits of utilitarianism that I have noticed while reading Pettit and Braithwaite:

1. "For something to be criminalised, it must be the sort of challenge that can be criminalised with profit: it must not be the sort of challenge whose criminalisation is likely to do more harm than good." 

This phrase obviously carries out a trait of utilitarianism: as one would have noticed, it is one of Bentham's principles as presented in his book "The Principles of Penal Law" (Chapter "Cases where punishment is unjustified");

2. "Measures will vary with different sorts of offences, depending on the relationship between offender and victim and depending on the kind of offence. The offender may be a hardened character in whom it is difficult to render any act of apology or reconciliation, or any commitment not to offend again, credible."

To quite an extent, offences are to be categorized under retributivism. In applying the principle of perfect proportionality, talio, offences must be answered alike: "An eye for an eye".  The measure thus depends on the sort of offence, but that is where the comparison between retributivism and rectification stops at this point. As circumstances are to be taken in consideration by the court, before imposing any penal measures, the republican/ rectification theory gets closer to utilitarianism.

3. "In any case, both capital punishment and imprisonment, by the evidence of criminology, are dubious means of securing the sort of reassurance sought. Because prisons embitter offenders and introduce them to criminal values and skills, they provide a false assurance."

As an example of the consequentialist approach, this statement could not be any more concise. In presenting this utilitarian argument against capital punishment and imprisonment, Pettit and Braithwaite do not seem to neglect the nature of any offence; rather, they question whether punishment, in general, will succesfully outweigh crimes committed. The advantage of the rectification model is that it pays attention to reality.

Similarities and differences between rectification approach and retributivism
Some authors have compared the republican theory with retributivism. Pettit and Braithwaite themselves list one similarity and three main differences between rectification and retributivism as follows:

One feature in common between republican theory and retributivism, is that they would each have the courts look backwards to the offence in determining the sentence; they would each reject the licence-to-optimise approach, where optimising is thought of as a forward-looking activity. This common point leaves room for three major differences:

1. Retributivist theory cannot go deep in motivating the sort of response which it would have the courts display. The crime cannot go unpunished and that is the end of the matter. In the republican approach, there is no quick end of matter: the promotion of dominion serves as an independent yardstick for the appropriateness of the court's response.

2. Retributivists look in general for some way of repaying the offence, seeking a penalty that is proportionate to it. Republican theorists look to what is required by way of rectifying the offence. The point is not to repay the offence. Whereas the retributivist concentrates on the offence in abstraction, the republican will look to the harm done to victims and communities and will consider how best that harm may be put right in the sentence imposed on the offender.

3. There is a great difference between the predisposition of the retributivist and the republican when it comes to the question what kind of penalty and what degree of penalty ought to be imposed. Retributivists generally look for hard treatment and seek proportionality between the offence and punishment in how hard this treatment is delivered. "Punishment consistis in hard treatment, in a manner that conveys disapproval of the actor for his conduct".

Republicans acknowledge that the matter of what rectification requires, is dependent of the case. They recognize that in many cases what is sufficient for rectification may fall well below what is required on the account of retributivist metric of punishment.

Conclusion
From this, I draw the conclusion that the republican approach can be positioned between the classic utilitarianism and retributivism approaches of penal law. It shares with utilism the features of consequentialism; to some extent, the republican approach is forward-looking, in that it takes the reality of capital punishment into consideration. Some of the arguments used are even derived from Bentham' utilitarian principles.

With retributivists, the republicans have in common the feature of a backward-looking approach, rejecting the licence-to-optimise approach that some authors have "convicted" Pettit and Braithwaite of. 

The advantage of the republican model is that it seeks to provide the courts with a rather non-biased, independent yardstick in considering which punishment to impose on an offender; moreover, it does not hold one from being aware of all circumstances involved.

Utilistische strafrechtstheorieën: Beccaria en Bentham

Strafoplegging kan volgens het utilisme of utilitarisme uitsluitend worden gerechtvaardigd door de preventieve werking die ervan uit zou gaan. Bentham en Beccaria hebben utilistische strafrechtstheorieën ontwikkeld die in de kern grote gelijkenis vertonen, al ligt de nadruk bij Beccaria op de koppeling aan de verdragstheorie van Locke.

1. Beccaria
Revolutionair is Beccaria's stelling, dat straf een middel is, waarvan de effectiviteit ter discussie staat. Hoe verhoudt zich nu het argument van Beccaria, dat straf uitsluitend kan worden opgelegd ter speciale of generale preventie, tot de verdragstheorie van Locke?
De vestiging van de Staat is volgens Locke geen doel, maar een middel om de bescherming van 'Property' (Life, Liberty, Estate) te garanderen.

Uit Beccaria's uiteenzetting in Dei delitti e delle pene blijkt, hoezeer hij is geïnspireerd door de theorie van Locke:
"Geen enkel mens heeft een deel van zijn persoonlijke vrijheden afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, zonder een tegenprestatie te eisen. Indien het mogelijk was, zou iedereen zelfs willen, dat de maatschappelijke verplichtingen die wij op ons hebben genomen, wel op anderen drukken, maar niet onszelf niet zouden verbinden. De som van alle kleine deeltjes individuele vrijheid, afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, maakt de soevereiniteit van de natie uit.
        Er zijn tastbare middelen nodig om de mens te beletten, de gemeenschap in de vroegere chaotische (natuur)staat terug te storten. Deze middelen zijn de straffen. Er moeten motieven worden geschapen, die rechtstreeks de menselijke sensibiliteit weten te treffen.  Alleen de wetten kunnen de straffen bepalen [legaliteitsbeginsel, een novum van de hand van Beccaria]. Dit recht kan niemand anders bezitten dan de wetgever, die de gehele maatschappij, verbonden in het sociaal contract, vertegenwoordigt.
        Het is alleen omdat de mensen zich daartoe door omstandigheden genoodzaakt hebben gezien, dat zij een minimaal deel van hun vrijheid als pand aan de gemeenschap hebben gegeven (de burgers zijn niet tot één volk verenigd, als in de latere contractstheorie van Rousseau, maar blijven als individuen met eigen, weliswaar voor een deel opgegeven vrijheidsrechten, naast elkaar leven). De samenbundeling van alle minimale deeltjes maakt het recht tot straffen uit. Alles wat er meer bij komt, is niet gerechtvaardigd." (vert. J.M. Michiels)

De rechtvaardiging van overheidsgezag is dus onlosmakelijk verbonden met het recht tot straffen. Het recht van de soeverein om te straffen reikt niet verder dan de optelsom van de natuurlijke rechten die de mensen hebben overgedragen aan het soeverein gezag. De voorwaardelijkheid van de overdracht van de natuurlijke rechten, maakt duidelijk dat de overheid het recht tot strafoplegging slechts kan aanwenden, om het zelfbehoud van de burgers te beschermen.

Op welke gronden pleit Beccaria voor de gematigdheid van straffen? De eis van de effectiviteit wordt als volgt geformuleerd: "Het leed, dat de straf meebrengt, dient groter te zijn dan het voordeel dat het plegen van het misdrijf oplevert. Tot dit overwicht dient ook de overtuiging bij te dragen, dat men zijn straf niet kan ontlopen, alsook het verlies van de voordelen, die het misdrijf zou hebben meegebracht. Alle strengheid die deze grenzen overschrijdt, is overbodig en daarom tirannie."

Beccaria baseert zijn stelling, dat wrede straffen ineffectief zijn, op zijn observaties: "Hoe wreder de straffen, des te ongevoeliger wordt het menselijk gemoed. De overdreven wreedheid heeft zelfs een contradictoire werking: de delinquent zal een groter risico nemen om zijn straf te ontlopen. Er zullen meerdere delicten worden gepleegd, om de straf voor één enkel vergrijp te ontgaan."

Er wordt gewezen op twee andere nadelen, die het gevolg zijn van overdreven wrede straffen: "In de eerste plaats is het niet eenvoudig, een fundamenteel juiste verhouding te vinden tussen het begane misdrijf en de verdiende straf. Wanneer het uiterste punt van verzadiging is bereikt, is het onmogelijk om voor wandaden die nóg gevaarlijker zijn, een overeenkomstige straf ter preventie te ontwikkelen. Het tweede nadeel is, dat de overdreven wreedheid van de straffen, straffeloosheid met zich brengt. Een te wreed systeem wordt op de lange duur niet meer toegepast, hetgeen erop neerkomt dat de wet zelf de straffeloosheid in de hand werkt."

2. Klassiek utilisme: Bentham (en Mill)
Centraal in de utilistische theorie, zoals deze is ontwikkeld door Jeremy Bentham, staat de opvatting van de geluksmaximalisatie: "Whenever we have a choice between alternative actions or social policies, we must choose the one that has the best overall consequences. The purpose of the law is the same as morals: that is, to promote general welfare of all citizens. The freedom of citizens should not be restricted any more than is necessary. Either approve or disapprove actions that do augment or diminish the happiness of the party in question"

Door John Stuart Mill is het utilisme van Bentham 'verfijnd': Mill maakt een onderscheid in de gradaties van geluk. Het gaat om kwaliteit. Bentham, daarentegen, hanteert slechts een optelsom als maatstaf voor geluk. De essentie van het utilisme van Mill verschilt echter niet van dat van Bentham:
"According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end is an existence exempt as free as possible from pain- and rich in enjoyments."

Welbekend is de volgende passage uit zijn essay 'On Liberty':
"...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others [...] The only part for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. Over himself, his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."

Uit dit citaat blijkt impliciet, dat preventie de toepassing van straf rechtvaardigt.  Daarbij moet worden opgemerkt, dat Mill niet beoogt om de handelingsvrijheid van de burger, ter voorkoming van schade aan anderen, in algemene zin te beperken. Een dergelijke inbreuk op de autonomie van de burger, is slechts gerechtvaardigd, wanneer de overheid optreedt tegen kinderen en geesteszieken. Deze categorieën moeten tegen zichzelf in bescherming worden genomen.

2.2. Punishment and Deterrence: the aims of punishment
De utilistische rechtvaardiging van straf wordt helder uiteengezet door Bentham in zijn boek 'The Principles of Penal Law'.
Onder paragraaf 2.1(a), 'The Aims of Punishment', presenteert hij de doelen van het strafrecht als volgt:

"When an act has been committed which is followed, or threatens to be followed, two wishes suggest themselves: first, to obviate the danger of the like mischief in future; secondly, to compensate the mischief that has been done. The mischief likely to ensue from acts of the like kind, may arise from either of two sources: the conduct of the party himself who has been the author of the mischief already done, or the conduct of other persons as may have adequate motives and sufficient opportunities to do the like."

"Hence the prevention of offences divises itself into two branches:
Particular prevention, which applies to the delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is applicable to all, without exception."

De volgende passage spitst de karakteristieken van het klassieke utilisme ("pain and pleasure are sovereign" en "subtracting the magnitude of pleasure and the magnitude of pain") van Bentham toe op de preventieve functie van het strafrecht:

"Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner, to withdraw him from that act. If the apparent magnitude of that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude of the pleasure he expects to be the consequence of that act, he will be absolutely prevented from commiting the mischief."

2.3. The Quantum of Punishment
In de optiek van Bentham is preventie het enige legitieme doel van strafrecht (typisch utilisme: straf is geen doel, maar een middel). Hoe kan het strafrecht effectief worden toegepast?

Rule 1. The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence.
If it be, the offence will sure be committed notwithstanding; the whole punishment will be inefficacious. The strength of the tempation, ceteris paribus, is as the profit of the offence: the quantum of the punishment must rise must rise with the profit of the offence- therefore, it must rise with the strength of the temptation

Rule 2. The greater the mischief of the offence, the greater is the expense, which it may be worth while to be at, in the way of punishment.

Rule 3. Where two offences come in competition, the punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.
With this is meant, that a man must be induced to choose always the least mischievous of two offences.

Rule 4. The punishment should be adjusted in such manner to each particular offence, that for every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender.
Has a man resolved upon a particular offence, he must be induced to do no more mischief than is necessary for his purpose (applies to our society as well: manslaughter is more than disproportionate when a delinquent allegedly was in search for his victim's wallet).

Rule 5. The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given.
Whatever mischief is guarded against, the object is to guard against it at as cheap rate as possible.

Rule 6. The quantity actually inflicted on each individual offender may correspond to the quantity intented for similar offenders in general, the several circumstances influencing sensibility ought always to be taken into account.
Punishment which is the same in name will not always produce in two persons the same degree of pain. Hence is why all circumstances influencing the sensibility of the offender must be taken into account.

The first four rules set out the limits below which punishment ought not to be diminished; the fifth rule presents the limit above which punishment is ought not to be increased. The sixth rule is intented for guiding the judge.