John Locke. The second Treatise on Government (1680-1690)

Cited from: Two Treatises on Government, 1680-1690

1. Of the State of Nature
Book II, Chapter 2
To understand political aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom [..]. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

[..] A state of nature is not yet a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontrolllable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one.

[..] In the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.

2. Of the Ends of Political Society and Government
Book II, Chapter 9

Para. 123.
If man in the state of nature be so free as has been said, if he be the absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom [..] and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?

Though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he. The greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of property he has in this state is very unsafe. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears. It is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society for the mutual preservation of life, liberty and estate- together property.

Hence, since men are equal- a characteristic of the state of nature- and since the state of nature lacks any governmental body to observe equity of justice, this estate results in great uncertainty and unsafety.

Para 124.
The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.

Para 125.
Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.

Para 126.
Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.

Para 128.
For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.

The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.

The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.

Para 129.

The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.

Para 130.
Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.

Para 131.
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.

And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

Utilistische strafrechtstheorieën: Beccaria en Bentham

Strafoplegging kan volgens het utilisme of utilitarisme uitsluitend worden gerechtvaardigd door de preventieve werking die ervan uit zou gaan. Bentham en Beccaria hebben utilistische strafrechtstheorieën ontwikkeld die in de kern grote gelijkenis vertonen, al ligt de nadruk bij Beccaria op de koppeling aan de verdragstheorie van Locke.

1. Beccaria
Revolutionair is Beccaria's stelling, dat straf een middel is, waarvan de effectiviteit ter discussie staat. Hoe verhoudt zich nu het argument van Beccaria, dat straf uitsluitend kan worden opgelegd ter speciale of generale preventie, tot de verdragstheorie van Locke?
De vestiging van de Staat is volgens Locke geen doel, maar een middel om de bescherming van 'Property' (Life, Liberty, Estate) te garanderen.

Uit Beccaria's uiteenzetting in Dei delitti e delle pene blijkt, hoezeer hij is geïnspireerd door de theorie van Locke:
"Geen enkel mens heeft een deel van zijn persoonlijke vrijheden afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, zonder een tegenprestatie te eisen. Indien het mogelijk was, zou iedereen zelfs willen, dat de maatschappelijke verplichtingen die wij op ons hebben genomen, wel op anderen drukken, maar niet onszelf niet zouden verbinden. De som van alle kleine deeltjes individuele vrijheid, afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, maakt de soevereiniteit van de natie uit.
        Er zijn tastbare middelen nodig om de mens te beletten, de gemeenschap in de vroegere chaotische (natuur)staat terug te storten. Deze middelen zijn de straffen. Er moeten motieven worden geschapen, die rechtstreeks de menselijke sensibiliteit weten te treffen.  Alleen de wetten kunnen de straffen bepalen [legaliteitsbeginsel, een novum van de hand van Beccaria]. Dit recht kan niemand anders bezitten dan de wetgever, die de gehele maatschappij, verbonden in het sociaal contract, vertegenwoordigt.
        Het is alleen omdat de mensen zich daartoe door omstandigheden genoodzaakt hebben gezien, dat zij een minimaal deel van hun vrijheid als pand aan de gemeenschap hebben gegeven (de burgers zijn niet tot één volk verenigd, als in de latere contractstheorie van Rousseau, maar blijven als individuen met eigen, weliswaar voor een deel opgegeven vrijheidsrechten, naast elkaar leven). De samenbundeling van alle minimale deeltjes maakt het recht tot straffen uit. Alles wat er meer bij komt, is niet gerechtvaardigd." (vert. J.M. Michiels)

De rechtvaardiging van overheidsgezag is dus onlosmakelijk verbonden met het recht tot straffen. Het recht van de soeverein om te straffen reikt niet verder dan de optelsom van de natuurlijke rechten die de mensen hebben overgedragen aan het soeverein gezag. De voorwaardelijkheid van de overdracht van de natuurlijke rechten, maakt duidelijk dat de overheid het recht tot strafoplegging slechts kan aanwenden, om het zelfbehoud van de burgers te beschermen.

Op welke gronden pleit Beccaria voor de gematigdheid van straffen? De eis van de effectiviteit wordt als volgt geformuleerd: "Het leed, dat de straf meebrengt, dient groter te zijn dan het voordeel dat het plegen van het misdrijf oplevert. Tot dit overwicht dient ook de overtuiging bij te dragen, dat men zijn straf niet kan ontlopen, alsook het verlies van de voordelen, die het misdrijf zou hebben meegebracht. Alle strengheid die deze grenzen overschrijdt, is overbodig en daarom tirannie."

Beccaria baseert zijn stelling, dat wrede straffen ineffectief zijn, op zijn observaties: "Hoe wreder de straffen, des te ongevoeliger wordt het menselijk gemoed. De overdreven wreedheid heeft zelfs een contradictoire werking: de delinquent zal een groter risico nemen om zijn straf te ontlopen. Er zullen meerdere delicten worden gepleegd, om de straf voor één enkel vergrijp te ontgaan."

Er wordt gewezen op twee andere nadelen, die het gevolg zijn van overdreven wrede straffen: "In de eerste plaats is het niet eenvoudig, een fundamenteel juiste verhouding te vinden tussen het begane misdrijf en de verdiende straf. Wanneer het uiterste punt van verzadiging is bereikt, is het onmogelijk om voor wandaden die nóg gevaarlijker zijn, een overeenkomstige straf ter preventie te ontwikkelen. Het tweede nadeel is, dat de overdreven wreedheid van de straffen, straffeloosheid met zich brengt. Een te wreed systeem wordt op de lange duur niet meer toegepast, hetgeen erop neerkomt dat de wet zelf de straffeloosheid in de hand werkt."

2. Klassiek utilisme: Bentham (en Mill)
Centraal in de utilistische theorie, zoals deze is ontwikkeld door Jeremy Bentham, staat de opvatting van de geluksmaximalisatie: "Whenever we have a choice between alternative actions or social policies, we must choose the one that has the best overall consequences. The purpose of the law is the same as morals: that is, to promote general welfare of all citizens. The freedom of citizens should not be restricted any more than is necessary. Either approve or disapprove actions that do augment or diminish the happiness of the party in question"

Door John Stuart Mill is het utilisme van Bentham 'verfijnd': Mill maakt een onderscheid in de gradaties van geluk. Het gaat om kwaliteit. Bentham, daarentegen, hanteert slechts een optelsom als maatstaf voor geluk. De essentie van het utilisme van Mill verschilt echter niet van dat van Bentham:
"According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end is an existence exempt as free as possible from pain- and rich in enjoyments."

Welbekend is de volgende passage uit zijn essay 'On Liberty':
"...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others [...] The only part for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. Over himself, his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."

Uit dit citaat blijkt impliciet, dat preventie de toepassing van straf rechtvaardigt.  Daarbij moet worden opgemerkt, dat Mill niet beoogt om de handelingsvrijheid van de burger, ter voorkoming van schade aan anderen, in algemene zin te beperken. Een dergelijke inbreuk op de autonomie van de burger, is slechts gerechtvaardigd, wanneer de overheid optreedt tegen kinderen en geesteszieken. Deze categorieën moeten tegen zichzelf in bescherming worden genomen.

2.2. Punishment and Deterrence: the aims of punishment
De utilistische rechtvaardiging van straf wordt helder uiteengezet door Bentham in zijn boek 'The Principles of Penal Law'.
Onder paragraaf 2.1(a), 'The Aims of Punishment', presenteert hij de doelen van het strafrecht als volgt:

"When an act has been committed which is followed, or threatens to be followed, two wishes suggest themselves: first, to obviate the danger of the like mischief in future; secondly, to compensate the mischief that has been done. The mischief likely to ensue from acts of the like kind, may arise from either of two sources: the conduct of the party himself who has been the author of the mischief already done, or the conduct of other persons as may have adequate motives and sufficient opportunities to do the like."

"Hence the prevention of offences divises itself into two branches:
Particular prevention, which applies to the delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is applicable to all, without exception."

De volgende passage spitst de karakteristieken van het klassieke utilisme ("pain and pleasure are sovereign" en "subtracting the magnitude of pleasure and the magnitude of pain") van Bentham toe op de preventieve functie van het strafrecht:

"Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner, to withdraw him from that act. If the apparent magnitude of that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude of the pleasure he expects to be the consequence of that act, he will be absolutely prevented from commiting the mischief."

2.3. The Quantum of Punishment
In de optiek van Bentham is preventie het enige legitieme doel van strafrecht (typisch utilisme: straf is geen doel, maar een middel). Hoe kan het strafrecht effectief worden toegepast?

Rule 1. The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence.
If it be, the offence will sure be committed notwithstanding; the whole punishment will be inefficacious. The strength of the tempation, ceteris paribus, is as the profit of the offence: the quantum of the punishment must rise must rise with the profit of the offence- therefore, it must rise with the strength of the temptation

Rule 2. The greater the mischief of the offence, the greater is the expense, which it may be worth while to be at, in the way of punishment.

Rule 3. Where two offences come in competition, the punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.
With this is meant, that a man must be induced to choose always the least mischievous of two offences.

Rule 4. The punishment should be adjusted in such manner to each particular offence, that for every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender.
Has a man resolved upon a particular offence, he must be induced to do no more mischief than is necessary for his purpose (applies to our society as well: manslaughter is more than disproportionate when a delinquent allegedly was in search for his victim's wallet).

Rule 5. The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given.
Whatever mischief is guarded against, the object is to guard against it at as cheap rate as possible.

Rule 6. The quantity actually inflicted on each individual offender may correspond to the quantity intented for similar offenders in general, the several circumstances influencing sensibility ought always to be taken into account.
Punishment which is the same in name will not always produce in two persons the same degree of pain. Hence is why all circumstances influencing the sensibility of the offender must be taken into account.

The first four rules set out the limits below which punishment ought not to be diminished; the fifth rule presents the limit above which punishment is ought not to be increased. The sixth rule is intented for guiding the judge.

A comparison of Classic Social Contract Theories

History of social contract theories
Social contract theories have been around since the first forms of society arose in the ancient world, one of the best known dialogues being Plato's De Res Publica, which sets out that the principle of social contract is to establish convenants in order to enforce the mutual agreement neither to inflict injustice, nor to suffer injustice.

Marsilius of Padua would develop a theory quite similar to modern-day social contract theories. In his writing, Defensor Pacis (1324), he states that not the Church, but the prince has autonomy and the right of jurisdiction within his territory, only to be bound by mandate of the people and their consent, as the people are the source of all political power and government. The prince has to carry out his obligations- if he fails to do so by violating the law, he will be punished.

Common features of and differences between Social Contract Theories: a comparison

1. State of Nature
The original state is the State of Nature, in which men have no order, no law and no bodies to enforce law. How the "State of Nature" is viewed by a social contract theorist, depends on the context in which the author himself is placed: witnessing a series of civil wars, it is understandable that Hobbes predicted life in a state of nature to be "brutish and short" and that only absolutism would make an end of this actual state of war in the seventeenth century.

Although Locke's State of Nature, a pre-political state, is not considered devoid of morality- on the contrary, the State of Nature is the state of liberty where people even recognize the Law of Nature and therefore do not harm each other- the equality of men and a lack of organization is what will amount to a rather insecure and unsafe state of being. Emphasizing the individual right to "Life, Liberty and Estate", the right to Property, it should not surprise that Locke has written his thesis in favor of the rising middle class in the spirit of the early Age of Enlightenment. That is probably the main reason why Locke's conceptions of the "State of Nature" and the social contract cannot be as unyielding as Hobbes' conceptions were- but then again, Locke's writings were published after the Glorious Revolution (1688); worlds apart from the English Civil War that has inspired Hobbes to writing his infamous Leviathan (1651).

Rousseau's view of the State of Nature is surprisingly positive (he spent his days in the French salons chatting about on intellectual topics): the State of Nature seemed like paradise, but the introduction of property and culture has made it impossible for man to stay in the State of Nature. In that respect,
"Contrat social" (1780)  is clear and concise on the importance of establishing society on a "volonté générale" rather than on a "volonté de tous".

I would go as far as to say that Hobbes' Leviathan accurately describes the world we live in, whereas Locke seemed merely blinded by the favor of his audience: as life in the State of Nature was all that perfect and men would, by nature, live up to their obligations, then it is rather inconsistent to suppose that only the acquisition of property leads to unsafety and that a simple increase in conflicts would amount to a state of war.

It seems to me that, behind his rhetoric, Locke makes a quite similar point. The state of nature may not be equal to a state of war like it is in Hobbes' view, but the state of nature will result in a state of war to the slightest.
I would not say that an abolute sovereign is the solution to modern global troubles (on the contrary), but it goes to show that on a global scale, the lack of effective government indeed in the event results in a poor and brutish life, overall unsafety and insecurity.

2. Pactum unionis and (subsequent) pactum subjectionis
Common to all social contract theories are either pactum unionis or pactum subjectionis, or a simultaneous application of both pacta, sometimes referred to as the first being the "phase of historical fact" and the latter being the "phase of legal reason" The pactum unionis implies that men have passed from a State of Nature to a State of Society by means of a contract by which they have imposed on themselves the obligation to respect each others rights, thus, a pact with horizontal effect; the pactum subjectionis implies that people undertake to obey the government, chosen by them
(W. Friedman, Natural Law and Social Contract, London 1967, p.118).

Comparing Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, it becomes clear that Hobbes has envisioned solely a pactum subjectionis, for only an absolute sovereign could govern effectively; Locke envisioned the pactum unionis and pactum subjectionis subsequently; in Rousseau's theory, as the sovereign is inherent to "volonté générale", as there is no higher authority or power, no other pact than the pactum unionis is essential to his conception of social contract.

3. Marking the end of the Ages of "divine law" and Medieval incorporate personality
One main feature that is common to all social contract theories, is that the source of all political power lies within the people; this view distincts the early Ages of Enlightenment from the Medieval Period, in which the idea of the existence of "divine law", granting political authority to the sovereign, would govern the people.
According to Friedman, another common feature is the individualistic and "atomistic conception" of society, in that the state is the legal creation of indivdual will, as opposed to the organic view of society and incorporate personality as was applicable to society in the Medieval.