Overzicht
1. Kelsen: partijenstaat;
2. Schumpeter: elitisme;
3. Dahl: pluralisme;
4. Ely: representatieve democratie volgens Madison's checks and balances;
5. Overeenkomsten en verschillen Ely en Dworkin;
6. Dworkin: constitutionele democratie
1. Kelsen (1920): partijenstaat
Typerend voor het relativisme van Kelsen is het onderscheid tussen
politieke ideologie en realiteit. Er bestaat in een democratie niet
zoiets als de absolute waarheid; de autocratie wordt daarentegen
gekenmerkt door de claim over de absolute waarheid te beschikken.
Sommige auteurs menen in de theorie van Kelsen een contradictie te
bespeuren: "een absolute waarheid bestaat niet, dus de meerderheid dient
te beslissen." Dit is een te ongenuanceerde lezing van Kelsen. Mertens
komt met een goede samenvatting van de gedachte van Kelsen: "Je bent
democraat als je bereid bent te aanvaarden dat de waarheid relatief is.
Dat impliceert de bereidheid om de mening van de ander te aanvaarden als
rechtsregel, wanneer die mening op democratische wijze een meerderheid
achter zich heeft verzameld." (Mertens, 2012)
In Kelsens opvatting is de democratie een partijenstaat, gebaseerd op
vrijheid. Dat beeld komt overeen met de tijdgeest (1920): het ontstaan
van politieke partijen kon niet langer worden genegeerd door de
toentertijd bestaande instituties. Het is duidelijk dat Kelsen de
integratiefunctie van de politieke partij als een positieve factor
beschouwt voor het ontwikkelen van een "gemeenschapswil". In het
bestaande model is de volkswil niet meer dan een compromis tussen de
versnipperde belangen van individuen. De politieke partij kan bovendien
zelfs worden gezien als de aanzet om een daadwerkelijk "volk" te doen
ontstaan:
"De onderverdeling van het volk in politieke partijen betekent in feite
dat: de organisatorische voorwaarde voor het tot stand komen van
dergelijke compromissen, dat de mogelijkheid daarvoor geschapen wordt,
dat de gemeenschapswil zich beweegt in de richting van een in het midden
gelegen lijn. Juist omdat de democratie als partijenstaat de
gemeenschapswil alleen als resultante van de partij-willen wil laten
ontstaan, kan zij afzien van de fictie van een boven de partijen staande
'organische' algemene wil. De democratische ontwikkeling laat de massa
van individuen tot (constitutioneel verankerde) politieke partijen
integreren en ontketent daarmee sociale entiteiten die men als volk kan
aanduiden."
Waarom is de parlementaire democratie niet voldoende om "democratisch"
te heten? Omdat, volgens Kelsen, de politieke vrijheid tot niet meer dan
een stemrecht verwordt. De natuurlijke vrijheid wordt ingeperkt tot
politieke zelfbeschikking op basis van meerderheidsbesluiten, het ideële
begrip van volk wordt gereduceerd tot diegenen die stemrecht hebben en
hun stem ook uitbrengen. Op die wijze wordt de sociale werkelijkheid die
de democratie wordt genoemd, niet daadwerkelijk gecreëerd.
2. Schumpeter (1942): elitisme
Schumpeter richt zich tegen de klassieke SCT: er
bestaat niet zoiets als de "volonté générale" of een gemeenschappelijke
wil van de bevolking. Aangezien de besluitvorming door het volk niet
gericht is op het gemeenschappelijk belang, leidt de regering door het
volk tot onacceptabele uitkomsten.
In de opvatting van Schumpeter is democratie daadwerkelijk een
concurrentiestrijd tussen politieke elites, om de stem van het volk en
daarmee een strijd om de macht.
3. Dahl (1956): pluralisme
De kritiek van Dahl op de procedures richt zich in eerste instantie op
het Madisoniaanse systeem van checks and balances. Het Madisoniaanse
systeem van checks and balances beoogt de democratie te bewaken tegen de
"tirannie der meerderheid". Vanuit theoretisch perspectief is het
volgens Dahl niet duidelijk, waarom een meerderheid noodzakelijkerwijs
leidt tot tirannie. Vanuit het empirische perspectief kan niet worden
verklaard, waarom het model sterk geconcentreerd is rond instituties en
niet ook rond sociale en democratische aspecten.
Een ander punt van kritiek is dat de bescherming tegen de tirannie der
meerderheid, nu juist resulteert in de tirannie van de minderheid. Het
populistisch model, waarin democratie wordt beschouwd als de integratie
van politieke gelijkheid, volkssoevereiniteit en regering door de
meerderheid, volstaat niet, omdat het zelden zo is dat de meerderheid
regeert. De conclusie van Dahl is dan ook, dat democratie in feite
"regering door een minderheid" en "regering door minderheden" is.
4. Ely: representatieve democratie, volgens Madison checks and balances
Ely neemt het bestaande Madisoniaanse systeem van checks and balances
als uitgangspunt. De procedure dient de representatieve democratie te
bewaken. Daarbij moeten de visies en belangen van alle betrokkenen
worden meegewogen. De taak van de rechter is om de grondrechten te
beschermen, maar wel in beperkte mate: zo wordt de uitkomst van de
politieke besluitvorming niet materieel getoetst; slechts de
grondrechten die onontbeerlijk zijn voor de representatieve democratie,
dienen te worden beschermd. Het door Ely als fundamenteel beschouwde
gelijkheidsbeginsel, betekent in de praktijk vooral formele gelijkheid.
De kritiek op Ely luidt dan ook, dat materiële gelijkheid met zijn
theorie niet zal worden bereikt.
5. Overeenkomsten en verschillen Ely en Dworkin
Zowel Ely als
Dworkin neemt de bestaande constituties (Madisonian checks and
balances) tot uitgangspunt van de door hen ontwikkelde
democratietheorieën; een andere belangrijke overeenkomst tussen beide
auteurs, is dat de rechter de grondrechten die van belang zijn voor het
functioneren van de democratie en de kwaliteit van het politieke proces,
dient te beschermen.
Dworkin heeft in het bijzonder de procedurele aard van Ely's visie
bekritiseerd: "Whether the value of the political opportunities a system
provides is equal, will depend on whether the legislation likely at the
end of the procedure treats everyone as equals".
Het gelijkheidsbeginsel, "equal concern and respect", aldus Dworkin,
heeft betrekking op de materiële uitkomst van het politieke proces
(output); voor de input dient een andere maatstaf te worden ontwikkeld.
In de visie van Dworkin heeft de Supreme Court bovendien de taak om álle
grondrechten te beschermen, niet slechts de grondrechten die wezenlijk
zijn voor het waarborgen van de integriteit van democratische
procedures.
6. Dworkin: constitutionele democratie
Dworkin verwerpt de meerderheidslezing, de "majoritarian premise", die hij als volgt omschrijft:
"The majoritarian premise insists that politcal procedures should be
designed so, that the decision that is reached, is the decision that a
majority or plurality of citizens would favor, if it had adequate
information and enough time for reflection."
"People who assume that the majoritarian premise is the ultimate
definition of democracy, accept that on some occasions the majority
should not govern. Though, it does insist that, even if some derogation
from majoritarian government is justified, something morally regrettable
has happened. The premise supposes, in other words, that it is always
unfair when a political majority is not allowed to have its way."
Vervolgens wordt de constitutionele opvatting van democratie voorgesteld:
"The constitutional conception of democracy takes the defining aim of
democracy to be a different one: that collective decisions be made by
political institutions, whose structure, composition and practices treat
all members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and
respect."
Uit de laatste zin, "Political institutions should treat individuals with equal concern and respect", wordt het volgende afgeleid:
a. equal concern relates to "human beings are capable of suffering and frustration";
b. equal respect relates to "human beings who are capable of forming and
acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived".
c. equal concern and respect does not imply equal treatment; rather, it implies treatment as an equal.
Uit deze kenschets van de constitutionele opvatting van democratie,
"equal respect and concern", vloeien de volgende criteria voort:
1. gelijke stem;
2. besluitvorming op basis van het meerderheidsprincipe (N.B. anders dan
"majoritarian premise"! Meerderheidsbeginsel wordt hier gelezen als één
van de onderdelen van de democratie (naast mensenrechten); eveneens
gebaseerd op gelijkheidsbeginsel van gelijke zorg en respect);
3. meerderheidsbeginsel aangevuld met bescherming van minderheden door grondrechten (corrigerende factor op meerheidsprincipe);
4. bescherming van de grondrechten door Supreme Court.
Literatuur
Burg, W. van der, Het democratisch perspectief (1991);
Dworkin, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise;
Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929)
Mertens, Eenieder heeft recht op deelname aan het bestuur (2012).
zondag 23 april 2017
vrijdag 21 april 2017
Justice as fairness vs. Justice in holdings: an analysis of Rawls and Nozick
Abstract
1.1. Rawls: linking modern contract theories to classic social contract theories;
1.2. Justice as fairness- the original position;
1.3. Principles of Justice;
2.1. Robert Nozic: Justice in Holdings
1.1. Rawls: linking modern contract theories to classic contract theories
As a modern social contract theorist, Rawls seeks to refine the definition put forward by classic social contract theorists such as Rousseau and Locke.
He does so by not thinking of the original contract as one to enter into a particular society. Rather, the object of the original contract are the principles of justice for the basic structure of society, provided that these principles would be accepted by free and rational persons in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.
1.2. Justice as fairness- the original position
Certain principles regulate all further agreements- they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government to be established. This way of regarding principles of justice is then to be called "Justice as fairness".
A purely hypothetical situation is introduced as "the original position". The original position is often critized by contemporary theorists. It is the question, though, if Rawls' proposition of a hypothetical position of equality among men, is understood within its context. Nowhere seems to be made the claim that reality would meet the requirements of principles of justice as set out by Rawls. Rawls is, ultimately, a theorist. His original position functions well as a starting point before entering into any kind of a social contract and developing any conception of justice. Rawls' conception of an ideal society is no more than a "thought experiment", like the classic social theories designed by his predecessors (from Plato to Rousseau). [ M.B.]
As Rawls himself puts it: "The choices which rational men would make in a hypothetical situation of equal liberty determine the principles of justice. In justice as fairness, the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in classic social contract theories. This position is not a historical fact; it is understood as a purely hypothetical situation to lead to a certain conception of justice."
An essential feature of the original position is that of a "veil of ignorance"- the initial status quo appropriate to reach agreements as fair as possible. The veil of ignorance is that "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the natural distribution of assets like intelligence and strength. This implies that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged, thus no one is able to design principles in his favor."
This concept serves to maintain that principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement. In the social world, natural assets, such as intelligence and strength, are no more than arbitrary from a moral point of view. Rawls explains that "justice as fairness" conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to under fair conditions. Hence is why Rawls' contract theory can be described as one of "procedural justice" [M.B.].
To justify the original position, Rawls states that "The purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons. The state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrum."
In adopting principles, would the (commonly accepted) principle of utility be acknowledged?
"It hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equal, would agree to a principle which may require lesser life prospects for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others. No one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction. No rational man would accept a structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages. The utility principle is incompatible with the conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage."
Rawls proposes to replace the utility principle with his two infamous principles of justice:
"The first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities are permissible, if only they result in compensating benefits for everyone- in particular the least advantaged in society."
1.3. Principles of Justice
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties, compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others;
2. Both social and economic equalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a. reasonably expected to be at everyone's advantage;
b. attached to positions and offices open for all.
1. Rawls lists the basic liberties as "political liberty and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; integrity of the person; the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest."
2. The second principle is referred to as the "difference principle": inequalities are admissible, provided that they are at the advantage to the least advantaged.
A lexical order is presented: these principles are to be arranged so with the first principle of basic liberties prior to the second. Infringement of the liberties protected by the first principle, cannot be justified by the second. It is, however, important to note that none of these liberties is absolute. If it be, an infringement would be imposed on the "right to property" in order to reach an equality of econonomic resources.
2.1. Robert Nozick: Justice in Holdings (Libertarianism)
Contributing to the debate of distribution, Nozick develops the "Entitlement theory" of "Justice in Holdings". According to Nozick, "there is no distribution of goods we want to own, in a sense of these goods being "divided" by any given government. What each person gets, he gets from others in exchange for something, or as a gift." In this view, Rawls seems to ignore the factor of reciprocity that leads man to obtain goods.
"Justice in holdings" implies:
(a) that one can acquire an object along the principles of just acquisition [res nullius; mixing one's labor with the object (Locke) M.B.];
(b) that one could obtain an object in accordance with the principles of just transfer.
The "justice" aspect is to point out that no one can justly own an object where the ownership cannot be traced by the application of one/ both of these principles.
In "Anarchy, State and Utopia", Nozick proposes a "minimal state, limited to the function of the protection of personal property. Any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced and is not justified. Individuals have rights, and there are things that no person or group may do to them without violating their rights. The state may not use its coercive apparatus to get citizens to aid others [re-distribution of sources, M.B.], or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good."
Nozick takes into consideration the anarchist claim that a state using its coercive apparatus, violates an individuals' rights and is therefore intrinsically immoral. Turning to the tradition of social thought, utopian theory, Nozick states that "..what can be saved from this tradition is precisely the structure of a minimal state."
Just like Rawls, the theory developed by Nozick is a thought experiment. On a closer reading, one will discover that nowhere the entitlement theory is presented as an absolute postulate. Nozick's thought experiment seems to strike a balance between an anarchist view of the state and Rawls' theory of distributive justice.
Recommended reading
Bix, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 2012;
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974;
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971.
1.1. Rawls: linking modern contract theories to classic social contract theories;
1.2. Justice as fairness- the original position;
1.3. Principles of Justice;
2.1. Robert Nozic: Justice in Holdings
1.1. Rawls: linking modern contract theories to classic contract theories
As a modern social contract theorist, Rawls seeks to refine the definition put forward by classic social contract theorists such as Rousseau and Locke.
He does so by not thinking of the original contract as one to enter into a particular society. Rather, the object of the original contract are the principles of justice for the basic structure of society, provided that these principles would be accepted by free and rational persons in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.
1.2. Justice as fairness- the original position
Certain principles regulate all further agreements- they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government to be established. This way of regarding principles of justice is then to be called "Justice as fairness".
A purely hypothetical situation is introduced as "the original position". The original position is often critized by contemporary theorists. It is the question, though, if Rawls' proposition of a hypothetical position of equality among men, is understood within its context. Nowhere seems to be made the claim that reality would meet the requirements of principles of justice as set out by Rawls. Rawls is, ultimately, a theorist. His original position functions well as a starting point before entering into any kind of a social contract and developing any conception of justice. Rawls' conception of an ideal society is no more than a "thought experiment", like the classic social theories designed by his predecessors (from Plato to Rousseau). [ M.B.]
As Rawls himself puts it: "The choices which rational men would make in a hypothetical situation of equal liberty determine the principles of justice. In justice as fairness, the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in classic social contract theories. This position is not a historical fact; it is understood as a purely hypothetical situation to lead to a certain conception of justice."
An essential feature of the original position is that of a "veil of ignorance"- the initial status quo appropriate to reach agreements as fair as possible. The veil of ignorance is that "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the natural distribution of assets like intelligence and strength. This implies that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged, thus no one is able to design principles in his favor."
This concept serves to maintain that principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement. In the social world, natural assets, such as intelligence and strength, are no more than arbitrary from a moral point of view. Rawls explains that "justice as fairness" conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to under fair conditions. Hence is why Rawls' contract theory can be described as one of "procedural justice" [M.B.].
To justify the original position, Rawls states that "The purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons. The state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrum."
In adopting principles, would the (commonly accepted) principle of utility be acknowledged?
"It hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equal, would agree to a principle which may require lesser life prospects for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others. No one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction. No rational man would accept a structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages. The utility principle is incompatible with the conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage."
Rawls proposes to replace the utility principle with his two infamous principles of justice:
"The first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities are permissible, if only they result in compensating benefits for everyone- in particular the least advantaged in society."
1.3. Principles of Justice
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties, compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others;
2. Both social and economic equalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a. reasonably expected to be at everyone's advantage;
b. attached to positions and offices open for all.
1. Rawls lists the basic liberties as "political liberty and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; integrity of the person; the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest."
2. The second principle is referred to as the "difference principle": inequalities are admissible, provided that they are at the advantage to the least advantaged.
A lexical order is presented: these principles are to be arranged so with the first principle of basic liberties prior to the second. Infringement of the liberties protected by the first principle, cannot be justified by the second. It is, however, important to note that none of these liberties is absolute. If it be, an infringement would be imposed on the "right to property" in order to reach an equality of econonomic resources.
2.1. Robert Nozick: Justice in Holdings (Libertarianism)
Contributing to the debate of distribution, Nozick develops the "Entitlement theory" of "Justice in Holdings". According to Nozick, "there is no distribution of goods we want to own, in a sense of these goods being "divided" by any given government. What each person gets, he gets from others in exchange for something, or as a gift." In this view, Rawls seems to ignore the factor of reciprocity that leads man to obtain goods.
"Justice in holdings" implies:
(a) that one can acquire an object along the principles of just acquisition [res nullius; mixing one's labor with the object (Locke) M.B.];
(b) that one could obtain an object in accordance with the principles of just transfer.
The "justice" aspect is to point out that no one can justly own an object where the ownership cannot be traced by the application of one/ both of these principles.
In "Anarchy, State and Utopia", Nozick proposes a "minimal state, limited to the function of the protection of personal property. Any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced and is not justified. Individuals have rights, and there are things that no person or group may do to them without violating their rights. The state may not use its coercive apparatus to get citizens to aid others [re-distribution of sources, M.B.], or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good."
Nozick takes into consideration the anarchist claim that a state using its coercive apparatus, violates an individuals' rights and is therefore intrinsically immoral. Turning to the tradition of social thought, utopian theory, Nozick states that "..what can be saved from this tradition is precisely the structure of a minimal state."
Just like Rawls, the theory developed by Nozick is a thought experiment. On a closer reading, one will discover that nowhere the entitlement theory is presented as an absolute postulate. Nozick's thought experiment seems to strike a balance between an anarchist view of the state and Rawls' theory of distributive justice.
Recommended reading
Bix, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 2012;
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974;
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971.
donderdag 20 april 2017
The republican approach: rectification vs. retributivism and utilitarianism
The theory of rectification
The republican approach of penal law shares with utilitarianism its goal-oriented character, but the former has retributivist features as well. Can the "rectification" theory be positioned somewhere in between and what are the advantages?
Pettit and Braithwaite seek to find a theory that promotes personal dominion, a concept of republican liberty. Among some of the topical issues are what procedures should be followed in prosecution and adjudication and what sentences should be imposed for given offences. Any initiative taken in one part of the criminal system affects other parts of the system, thus creating "just deserts".
Retributivists have criticized that on the rectification approach, much like other goal-oriented or consequentialist theories like utilism/ utilitarianism, "A court is provided with a licence (to forward-looking and try to optimise results) to neglect the nature of the offence to which the sentence is meant to be a response."
Two notions of republican liberty
The 19th century notion of liberty was one of being free to enjoy a status constituted by protection and recognition of the law. This republican idea of liberty has evolved into thinking that freedom would be compromised by any interference, be it by protective law: as an isolated individual, one should enjoy perfect freedom [how realistic is this kind of thinking? In our contemporary world, few people live entirely separated from some sort of community].
Pettit and Braithwaite argue that the ideal of dominion, however, should be understood as "that non-interference should be enjoyed, not just a matter of contingent luck [ a kind of thinking reminiscent of Mill, M.Bouter], but in virtue of the protection of the law. Second, that it be salient to everyone in society, that the non-interference involved is of this resilient or secure character."
Important to note is that "Someone who enjoys non-interference, but does not do so resiliently, lives at the mercy of those who might choose to interfere." Pettit and Braithwaite could not be any more clear. Those who enjoy freedom from any interference by government, seem perfectly free, until others, similarly free from interference by (penal) laws, disrupt their liberty.
Crime as a denial of dominion
In republican theory, Pettit and Braithwaite describe crime as "denial of dominion". "Crime will always involve a negative challenge to the dominion status of the victim and to the dispensation of dominion as it exists in the community at large. Dominion is a good whose enjoyment by anyone is highly sensitive to evidence of its enjoyment by others." The authors point out that the denial of a person's dominion involves both the flouting (nullifying) of his status as a citizen protected and the destroyal of the victim's dominion.
The elements of rectification: recognition, recompense, reassuration
Thirst, the autors propose certain conditions in order to apply their theory of rectification:
"Given that crime represents a sort of damage to dominion, given that the damage is partly remediable and given that the task of the system is to promote dominion, the sentencing job of the courts is to try to rectify the damage caused by crime."
The elements of rectification are now presented: "In sentencing the convicted criminal, courts ought to seek recognition by the offender of the dominion status of the victim, recompense by the offender for the damage done and reassurance to community of a kind that may undo the negative impact of crime on their dominion."
Recognition by the offender of the dominion status of its victim alone is not enough: apologies for the act inflicted are just words. Although Pettit and Braithwaite discuss rectification in practice, it does not become clear which requirements have to be met. However, the authors do recognize that perfect rectification is not realistic.
Comparing the republican approach of rectification with utilitarianism (consequentialism)
To point out some of the traits of utilitarianism that I have noticed while reading Pettit and Braithwaite:
1. "For something to be criminalised, it must be the sort of challenge that can be criminalised with profit: it must not be the sort of challenge whose criminalisation is likely to do more harm than good."
This phrase obviously carries out a trait of utilitarianism: as one would have noticed, it is one of Bentham's principles as presented in his book "The Principles of Penal Law" (Chapter "Cases where punishment is unjustified");
2. "Measures will vary with different sorts of offences, depending on the relationship between offender and victim and depending on the kind of offence. The offender may be a hardened character in whom it is difficult to render any act of apology or reconciliation, or any commitment not to offend again, credible."
To quite an extent, offences are to be categorized under retributivism. In applying the principle of perfect proportionality, talio, offences must be answered alike: "An eye for an eye". The measure thus depends on the sort of offence, but that is where the comparison between retributivism and rectification stops at this point. As circumstances are to be taken in consideration by the court, before imposing any penal measures, the republican/ rectification theory gets closer to utilitarianism.
3. "In any case, both capital punishment and imprisonment, by the evidence of criminology, are dubious means of securing the sort of reassurance sought. Because prisons embitter offenders and introduce them to criminal values and skills, they provide a false assurance."
As an example of the consequentialist approach, this statement could not be any more concise. In presenting this utilitarian argument against capital punishment and imprisonment, Pettit and Braithwaite do not seem to neglect the nature of any offence; rather, they question whether punishment, in general, will succesfully outweigh crimes committed. The advantage of the rectification model is that it pays attention to reality.
Similarities and differences between rectification approach and retributivism
Some authors have compared the republican theory with retributivism. Pettit and Braithwaite themselves list one similarity and three main differences between rectification and retributivism as follows:
One feature in common between republican theory and retributivism, is that they would each have the courts look backwards to the offence in determining the sentence; they would each reject the licence-to-optimise approach, where optimising is thought of as a forward-looking activity. This common point leaves room for three major differences:
1. Retributivist theory cannot go deep in motivating the sort of response which it would have the courts display. The crime cannot go unpunished and that is the end of the matter. In the republican approach, there is no quick end of matter: the promotion of dominion serves as an independent yardstick for the appropriateness of the court's response.
2. Retributivists look in general for some way of repaying the offence, seeking a penalty that is proportionate to it. Republican theorists look to what is required by way of rectifying the offence. The point is not to repay the offence. Whereas the retributivist concentrates on the offence in abstraction, the republican will look to the harm done to victims and communities and will consider how best that harm may be put right in the sentence imposed on the offender.
3. There is a great difference between the predisposition of the retributivist and the republican when it comes to the question what kind of penalty and what degree of penalty ought to be imposed. Retributivists generally look for hard treatment and seek proportionality between the offence and punishment in how hard this treatment is delivered. "Punishment consistis in hard treatment, in a manner that conveys disapproval of the actor for his conduct".
Republicans acknowledge that the matter of what rectification requires, is dependent of the case. They recognize that in many cases what is sufficient for rectification may fall well below what is required on the account of retributivist metric of punishment.
Conclusion
From this, I draw the conclusion that the republican approach can be positioned between the classic utilitarianism and retributivism approaches of penal law. It shares with utilism the features of consequentialism; to some extent, the republican approach is forward-looking, in that it takes the reality of capital punishment into consideration. Some of the arguments used are even derived from Bentham' utilitarian principles.
With retributivists, the republicans have in common the feature of a backward-looking approach, rejecting the licence-to-optimise approach that some authors have "convicted" Pettit and Braithwaite of.
The advantage of the republican model is that it seeks to provide the courts with a rather non-biased, independent yardstick in considering which punishment to impose on an offender; moreover, it does not hold one from being aware of all circumstances involved.
The republican approach of penal law shares with utilitarianism its goal-oriented character, but the former has retributivist features as well. Can the "rectification" theory be positioned somewhere in between and what are the advantages?
Pettit and Braithwaite seek to find a theory that promotes personal dominion, a concept of republican liberty. Among some of the topical issues are what procedures should be followed in prosecution and adjudication and what sentences should be imposed for given offences. Any initiative taken in one part of the criminal system affects other parts of the system, thus creating "just deserts".
Retributivists have criticized that on the rectification approach, much like other goal-oriented or consequentialist theories like utilism/ utilitarianism, "A court is provided with a licence (to forward-looking and try to optimise results) to neglect the nature of the offence to which the sentence is meant to be a response."
Two notions of republican liberty
The 19th century notion of liberty was one of being free to enjoy a status constituted by protection and recognition of the law. This republican idea of liberty has evolved into thinking that freedom would be compromised by any interference, be it by protective law: as an isolated individual, one should enjoy perfect freedom [how realistic is this kind of thinking? In our contemporary world, few people live entirely separated from some sort of community].
Pettit and Braithwaite argue that the ideal of dominion, however, should be understood as "that non-interference should be enjoyed, not just a matter of contingent luck [ a kind of thinking reminiscent of Mill, M.Bouter], but in virtue of the protection of the law. Second, that it be salient to everyone in society, that the non-interference involved is of this resilient or secure character."
Important to note is that "Someone who enjoys non-interference, but does not do so resiliently, lives at the mercy of those who might choose to interfere." Pettit and Braithwaite could not be any more clear. Those who enjoy freedom from any interference by government, seem perfectly free, until others, similarly free from interference by (penal) laws, disrupt their liberty.
Crime as a denial of dominion
In republican theory, Pettit and Braithwaite describe crime as "denial of dominion". "Crime will always involve a negative challenge to the dominion status of the victim and to the dispensation of dominion as it exists in the community at large. Dominion is a good whose enjoyment by anyone is highly sensitive to evidence of its enjoyment by others." The authors point out that the denial of a person's dominion involves both the flouting (nullifying) of his status as a citizen protected and the destroyal of the victim's dominion.
The elements of rectification: recognition, recompense, reassuration
Thirst, the autors propose certain conditions in order to apply their theory of rectification:
"Given that crime represents a sort of damage to dominion, given that the damage is partly remediable and given that the task of the system is to promote dominion, the sentencing job of the courts is to try to rectify the damage caused by crime."
The elements of rectification are now presented: "In sentencing the convicted criminal, courts ought to seek recognition by the offender of the dominion status of the victim, recompense by the offender for the damage done and reassurance to community of a kind that may undo the negative impact of crime on their dominion."
Recognition by the offender of the dominion status of its victim alone is not enough: apologies for the act inflicted are just words. Although Pettit and Braithwaite discuss rectification in practice, it does not become clear which requirements have to be met. However, the authors do recognize that perfect rectification is not realistic.
Comparing the republican approach of rectification with utilitarianism (consequentialism)
To point out some of the traits of utilitarianism that I have noticed while reading Pettit and Braithwaite:
1. "For something to be criminalised, it must be the sort of challenge that can be criminalised with profit: it must not be the sort of challenge whose criminalisation is likely to do more harm than good."
This phrase obviously carries out a trait of utilitarianism: as one would have noticed, it is one of Bentham's principles as presented in his book "The Principles of Penal Law" (Chapter "Cases where punishment is unjustified");
2. "Measures will vary with different sorts of offences, depending on the relationship between offender and victim and depending on the kind of offence. The offender may be a hardened character in whom it is difficult to render any act of apology or reconciliation, or any commitment not to offend again, credible."
To quite an extent, offences are to be categorized under retributivism. In applying the principle of perfect proportionality, talio, offences must be answered alike: "An eye for an eye". The measure thus depends on the sort of offence, but that is where the comparison between retributivism and rectification stops at this point. As circumstances are to be taken in consideration by the court, before imposing any penal measures, the republican/ rectification theory gets closer to utilitarianism.
3. "In any case, both capital punishment and imprisonment, by the evidence of criminology, are dubious means of securing the sort of reassurance sought. Because prisons embitter offenders and introduce them to criminal values and skills, they provide a false assurance."
As an example of the consequentialist approach, this statement could not be any more concise. In presenting this utilitarian argument against capital punishment and imprisonment, Pettit and Braithwaite do not seem to neglect the nature of any offence; rather, they question whether punishment, in general, will succesfully outweigh crimes committed. The advantage of the rectification model is that it pays attention to reality.
Similarities and differences between rectification approach and retributivism
Some authors have compared the republican theory with retributivism. Pettit and Braithwaite themselves list one similarity and three main differences between rectification and retributivism as follows:
One feature in common between republican theory and retributivism, is that they would each have the courts look backwards to the offence in determining the sentence; they would each reject the licence-to-optimise approach, where optimising is thought of as a forward-looking activity. This common point leaves room for three major differences:
1. Retributivist theory cannot go deep in motivating the sort of response which it would have the courts display. The crime cannot go unpunished and that is the end of the matter. In the republican approach, there is no quick end of matter: the promotion of dominion serves as an independent yardstick for the appropriateness of the court's response.
2. Retributivists look in general for some way of repaying the offence, seeking a penalty that is proportionate to it. Republican theorists look to what is required by way of rectifying the offence. The point is not to repay the offence. Whereas the retributivist concentrates on the offence in abstraction, the republican will look to the harm done to victims and communities and will consider how best that harm may be put right in the sentence imposed on the offender.
3. There is a great difference between the predisposition of the retributivist and the republican when it comes to the question what kind of penalty and what degree of penalty ought to be imposed. Retributivists generally look for hard treatment and seek proportionality between the offence and punishment in how hard this treatment is delivered. "Punishment consistis in hard treatment, in a manner that conveys disapproval of the actor for his conduct".
Republicans acknowledge that the matter of what rectification requires, is dependent of the case. They recognize that in many cases what is sufficient for rectification may fall well below what is required on the account of retributivist metric of punishment.
Conclusion
From this, I draw the conclusion that the republican approach can be positioned between the classic utilitarianism and retributivism approaches of penal law. It shares with utilism the features of consequentialism; to some extent, the republican approach is forward-looking, in that it takes the reality of capital punishment into consideration. Some of the arguments used are even derived from Bentham' utilitarian principles.
With retributivists, the republicans have in common the feature of a backward-looking approach, rejecting the licence-to-optimise approach that some authors have "convicted" Pettit and Braithwaite of.
The advantage of the republican model is that it seeks to provide the courts with a rather non-biased, independent yardstick in considering which punishment to impose on an offender; moreover, it does not hold one from being aware of all circumstances involved.
woensdag 19 april 2017
Dispute Settlement beyond borders: GATT-WTO procedure within Trade Law
1. GATT: Fundamental principles
The predecessor of WTO, GATT, aims at the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce (Preamble GATT 1994). Note that parties to the WTO have given their consent to be bound by the treaty; therefore, it is only logical that GATT imposes obligations on these state parties.
Among the fundamental legal principles of GATT are the most-favoured nation clause (MFN, Article I GATT), the National Treatment clause (NT, Article III GATT), the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions (Art. XI (1) GATT) and Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (Art. VI GATT).
1.1. Non-discrimination
Taken together, the MFN (Art. I GATT) and NT (Art. III GATT) underlie the non-discrimination principle.
Art. I (1) GATT provides that any advantage granted by any contracting party to any product originating or destined for any other country, shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Art. III (2) GATT provides that the products of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied to like domestic products; moreover, the products imported into the territory of another contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin (only differential charges may be applied, based on the means of transport and not nationality of the product).
1.2. Market liberalization
Aiming at the liberalization of the global trade, tariffs need to be reduced and consolidated, Article II GATT (Schedules of Concessions). For the conditions of liberalization to be satisfied, Article III GATT is as necessary as it is for realizing the non-discrimination principle. Without the provisions of Art. III GATT, Article II GATT would be rendered of its practical value.
An example to explain this. State Q. confines itself to the reduction and consolidation of the tariff on imported cigarettes- the tariff is 10%. State R. imports cigarettes into the territory of State Q.
State Q. lower the tariff on domestic cigarettes (which would be considered like products by the Dispute Body) to 5%.
Should Article III GATT not be applicable, then it would be possible for State Q. to ultimately render the Schedules of Consessions from their effect; it could simply do so by favouring its internal market. From this example, it should be clear that provisions on market liberalization cannot do without the principle of non-discrimination (not without reason, MFN and NT are fundamental principles).
1.3. Exceptions
A state member to the WTO, restricting the import of products by another state member, could invoke exeptions to justify the application of restrictive measures. General exceptions are found in Article XX GATT; important exceptions are, for example, the protection of human, animal and plant life or health (b) and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Is the restrictive measure jusitified, the measure needs to meet the requirements under the "Chapeau", the Introductory Clause to Article XX GATT. Measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.
Thus, assuming that a measure is related to one of the purposes of the general or specific exceptions, any discriminating application of the measure is a violation of the exceptions provided.
2. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO-DSU)
Before bringing a dispute before the Panel, Members should utilize diplomatic means, the first of these being consultations (Article 4 DSU). If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within sixty days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations, the establishment of an ad hoc panel may be requested (Art. 4(7) DSU). The Procedures before the Panel are set out in Article 12 DSU.
The Appellate Body hears appeals from panel cases (Appellate review, Art. 17 DSU). Only parties to the dispute may appeal a panel report, but third parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter, pursuant to Article 10(2) DSU, may make submissions to and be given an opportunity to be heard by the AB (Art. 17(4) DSU). The appeal shall be limited to issues of law, covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel (Art. 17(6) DSU).
Both the panel procedure and appellate review work on a system of negative consensus: the DSB panel report will be adopted, unless all member decide by consensus not to adopt the report (Article 17 DSU). Following the appellate review, an AB report shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body, consisting of all WTO Members. Again, the report shall be adopted by negative consensus (Art. 14 DSU). This mechanism is often referred to as "quasi-automatic", as a decision by one or more, but not all Members, cannot affect the adoption of the report.
The predecessor of WTO, GATT, aims at the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce (Preamble GATT 1994). Note that parties to the WTO have given their consent to be bound by the treaty; therefore, it is only logical that GATT imposes obligations on these state parties.
Among the fundamental legal principles of GATT are the most-favoured nation clause (MFN, Article I GATT), the National Treatment clause (NT, Article III GATT), the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions (Art. XI (1) GATT) and Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (Art. VI GATT).
1.1. Non-discrimination
Taken together, the MFN (Art. I GATT) and NT (Art. III GATT) underlie the non-discrimination principle.
Art. I (1) GATT provides that any advantage granted by any contracting party to any product originating or destined for any other country, shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Art. III (2) GATT provides that the products of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied to like domestic products; moreover, the products imported into the territory of another contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin (only differential charges may be applied, based on the means of transport and not nationality of the product).
1.2. Market liberalization
Aiming at the liberalization of the global trade, tariffs need to be reduced and consolidated, Article II GATT (Schedules of Concessions). For the conditions of liberalization to be satisfied, Article III GATT is as necessary as it is for realizing the non-discrimination principle. Without the provisions of Art. III GATT, Article II GATT would be rendered of its practical value.
An example to explain this. State Q. confines itself to the reduction and consolidation of the tariff on imported cigarettes- the tariff is 10%. State R. imports cigarettes into the territory of State Q.
State Q. lower the tariff on domestic cigarettes (which would be considered like products by the Dispute Body) to 5%.
Should Article III GATT not be applicable, then it would be possible for State Q. to ultimately render the Schedules of Consessions from their effect; it could simply do so by favouring its internal market. From this example, it should be clear that provisions on market liberalization cannot do without the principle of non-discrimination (not without reason, MFN and NT are fundamental principles).
1.3. Exceptions
A state member to the WTO, restricting the import of products by another state member, could invoke exeptions to justify the application of restrictive measures. General exceptions are found in Article XX GATT; important exceptions are, for example, the protection of human, animal and plant life or health (b) and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Is the restrictive measure jusitified, the measure needs to meet the requirements under the "Chapeau", the Introductory Clause to Article XX GATT. Measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.
Thus, assuming that a measure is related to one of the purposes of the general or specific exceptions, any discriminating application of the measure is a violation of the exceptions provided.
2. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO-DSU)
Before bringing a dispute before the Panel, Members should utilize diplomatic means, the first of these being consultations (Article 4 DSU). If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within sixty days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations, the establishment of an ad hoc panel may be requested (Art. 4(7) DSU). The Procedures before the Panel are set out in Article 12 DSU.
The Appellate Body hears appeals from panel cases (Appellate review, Art. 17 DSU). Only parties to the dispute may appeal a panel report, but third parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter, pursuant to Article 10(2) DSU, may make submissions to and be given an opportunity to be heard by the AB (Art. 17(4) DSU). The appeal shall be limited to issues of law, covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel (Art. 17(6) DSU).
Both the panel procedure and appellate review work on a system of negative consensus: the DSB panel report will be adopted, unless all member decide by consensus not to adopt the report (Article 17 DSU). Following the appellate review, an AB report shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body, consisting of all WTO Members. Again, the report shall be adopted by negative consensus (Art. 14 DSU). This mechanism is often referred to as "quasi-automatic", as a decision by one or more, but not all Members, cannot affect the adoption of the report.
vrijdag 14 april 2017
John Locke. The second Treatise on Government (1680-1690)
Cited from: Two Treatises on Government, 1680-1690
1. Of the State of Nature
Book II, Chapter 2
To understand political aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom [..]. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
[..] A state of nature is not yet a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontrolllable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one.
[..] In the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
2. Of the Ends of Political Society and Government
Book II, Chapter 9
Para. 123.
If man in the state of nature be so free as has been said, if he be the absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom [..] and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?
Though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he. The greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of property he has in this state is very unsafe. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears. It is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society for the mutual preservation of life, liberty and estate- together property.
Para 125.
Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.
Para 128.
For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.
1. Of the State of Nature
Book II, Chapter 2
To understand political aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom [..]. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
[..] A state of nature is not yet a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontrolllable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one.
[..] In the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
2. Of the Ends of Political Society and Government
Book II, Chapter 9
Para. 123.
If man in the state of nature be so free as has been said, if he be the absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom [..] and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?
Though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he. The greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of property he has in this state is very unsafe. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears. It is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society for the mutual preservation of life, liberty and estate- together property.
Hence, since men are equal- a characteristic of the state of nature- and since the state of nature lacks any governmental body to observe equity of justice, this estate results in great uncertainty and unsafety.
Para 124.
The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
Para 124.
The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.
Para 126.
Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Para 128.
For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself,
and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to
them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one
society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption
and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no
necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and
by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the
crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a
private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates
into any common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Para 129.
The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the
preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated
by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and
the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many
things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
Para 130.
Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.
Para 131.
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.
And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.
Para 131.
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.
And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
donderdag 13 april 2017
Utilistische strafrechtstheorieën: Beccaria en Bentham
Strafoplegging kan volgens het utilisme of utilitarisme uitsluitend worden gerechtvaardigd door de preventieve werking die ervan uit zou gaan. Bentham en Beccaria hebben utilistische strafrechtstheorieën ontwikkeld die in de kern grote gelijkenis vertonen, al ligt de nadruk bij Beccaria op de koppeling aan de verdragstheorie van Locke.
1. Beccaria
Revolutionair is Beccaria's stelling, dat straf een middel is, waarvan de effectiviteit ter discussie staat. Hoe verhoudt zich nu het argument van Beccaria, dat straf uitsluitend kan worden opgelegd ter speciale of generale preventie, tot de verdragstheorie van Locke?
De vestiging van de Staat is volgens Locke geen doel, maar een middel om de bescherming van 'Property' (Life, Liberty, Estate) te garanderen.
Uit Beccaria's uiteenzetting in Dei delitti e delle pene blijkt, hoezeer hij is geïnspireerd door de theorie van Locke:
"Geen enkel mens heeft een deel van zijn persoonlijke vrijheden afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, zonder een tegenprestatie te eisen. Indien het mogelijk was, zou iedereen zelfs willen, dat de maatschappelijke verplichtingen die wij op ons hebben genomen, wel op anderen drukken, maar niet onszelf niet zouden verbinden. De som van alle kleine deeltjes individuele vrijheid, afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, maakt de soevereiniteit van de natie uit.
Er zijn tastbare middelen nodig om de mens te beletten, de gemeenschap in de vroegere chaotische (natuur)staat terug te storten. Deze middelen zijn de straffen. Er moeten motieven worden geschapen, die rechtstreeks de menselijke sensibiliteit weten te treffen. Alleen de wetten kunnen de straffen bepalen [legaliteitsbeginsel, een novum van de hand van Beccaria]. Dit recht kan niemand anders bezitten dan de wetgever, die de gehele maatschappij, verbonden in het sociaal contract, vertegenwoordigt.
Het is alleen omdat de mensen zich daartoe door omstandigheden genoodzaakt hebben gezien, dat zij een minimaal deel van hun vrijheid als pand aan de gemeenschap hebben gegeven (de burgers zijn niet tot één volk verenigd, als in de latere contractstheorie van Rousseau, maar blijven als individuen met eigen, weliswaar voor een deel opgegeven vrijheidsrechten, naast elkaar leven). De samenbundeling van alle minimale deeltjes maakt het recht tot straffen uit. Alles wat er meer bij komt, is niet gerechtvaardigd." (vert. J.M. Michiels)
De rechtvaardiging van overheidsgezag is dus onlosmakelijk verbonden met het recht tot straffen. Het recht van de soeverein om te straffen reikt niet verder dan de optelsom van de natuurlijke rechten die de mensen hebben overgedragen aan het soeverein gezag. De voorwaardelijkheid van de overdracht van de natuurlijke rechten, maakt duidelijk dat de overheid het recht tot strafoplegging slechts kan aanwenden, om het zelfbehoud van de burgers te beschermen.
Op welke gronden pleit Beccaria voor de gematigdheid van straffen? De eis van de effectiviteit wordt als volgt geformuleerd: "Het leed, dat de straf meebrengt, dient groter te zijn dan het voordeel dat het plegen van het misdrijf oplevert. Tot dit overwicht dient ook de overtuiging bij te dragen, dat men zijn straf niet kan ontlopen, alsook het verlies van de voordelen, die het misdrijf zou hebben meegebracht. Alle strengheid die deze grenzen overschrijdt, is overbodig en daarom tirannie."
Beccaria baseert zijn stelling, dat wrede straffen ineffectief zijn, op zijn observaties: "Hoe wreder de straffen, des te ongevoeliger wordt het menselijk gemoed. De overdreven wreedheid heeft zelfs een contradictoire werking: de delinquent zal een groter risico nemen om zijn straf te ontlopen. Er zullen meerdere delicten worden gepleegd, om de straf voor één enkel vergrijp te ontgaan."
Er wordt gewezen op twee andere nadelen, die het gevolg zijn van overdreven wrede straffen: "In de eerste plaats is het niet eenvoudig, een fundamenteel juiste verhouding te vinden tussen het begane misdrijf en de verdiende straf. Wanneer het uiterste punt van verzadiging is bereikt, is het onmogelijk om voor wandaden die nóg gevaarlijker zijn, een overeenkomstige straf ter preventie te ontwikkelen. Het tweede nadeel is, dat de overdreven wreedheid van de straffen, straffeloosheid met zich brengt. Een te wreed systeem wordt op de lange duur niet meer toegepast, hetgeen erop neerkomt dat de wet zelf de straffeloosheid in de hand werkt."
2. Klassiek utilisme: Bentham (en Mill)
Centraal in de utilistische theorie, zoals deze is ontwikkeld door Jeremy Bentham, staat de opvatting van de geluksmaximalisatie: "Whenever we have a choice between alternative actions or social policies, we must choose the one that has the best overall consequences. The purpose of the law is the same as morals: that is, to promote general welfare of all citizens. The freedom of citizens should not be restricted any more than is necessary. Either approve or disapprove actions that do augment or diminish the happiness of the party in question"
Door John Stuart Mill is het utilisme van Bentham 'verfijnd': Mill maakt een onderscheid in de gradaties van geluk. Het gaat om kwaliteit. Bentham, daarentegen, hanteert slechts een optelsom als maatstaf voor geluk. De essentie van het utilisme van Mill verschilt echter niet van dat van Bentham:
"According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end is an existence exempt as free as possible from pain- and rich in enjoyments."
Welbekend is de volgende passage uit zijn essay 'On Liberty':
"...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others [...] The only part for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. Over himself, his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
Uit dit citaat blijkt impliciet, dat preventie de toepassing van straf rechtvaardigt. Daarbij moet worden opgemerkt, dat Mill niet beoogt om de handelingsvrijheid van de burger, ter voorkoming van schade aan anderen, in algemene zin te beperken. Een dergelijke inbreuk op de autonomie van de burger, is slechts gerechtvaardigd, wanneer de overheid optreedt tegen kinderen en geesteszieken. Deze categorieën moeten tegen zichzelf in bescherming worden genomen.
2.2. Punishment and Deterrence: the aims of punishment
De utilistische rechtvaardiging van straf wordt helder uiteengezet door Bentham in zijn boek 'The Principles of Penal Law'.
Onder paragraaf 2.1(a), 'The Aims of Punishment', presenteert hij de doelen van het strafrecht als volgt:
"When an act has been committed which is followed, or threatens to be followed, two wishes suggest themselves: first, to obviate the danger of the like mischief in future; secondly, to compensate the mischief that has been done. The mischief likely to ensue from acts of the like kind, may arise from either of two sources: the conduct of the party himself who has been the author of the mischief already done, or the conduct of other persons as may have adequate motives and sufficient opportunities to do the like."
"Hence the prevention of offences divises itself into two branches:
Particular prevention, which applies to the delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is applicable to all, without exception."
De volgende passage spitst de karakteristieken van het klassieke utilisme ("pain and pleasure are sovereign" en "subtracting the magnitude of pleasure and the magnitude of pain") van Bentham toe op de preventieve functie van het strafrecht:
"Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner, to withdraw him from that act. If the apparent magnitude of that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude of the pleasure he expects to be the consequence of that act, he will be absolutely prevented from commiting the mischief."
2.3. The Quantum of Punishment
In de optiek van Bentham is preventie het enige legitieme doel van strafrecht (typisch utilisme: straf is geen doel, maar een middel). Hoe kan het strafrecht effectief worden toegepast?
Rule 1. The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence.
If it be, the offence will sure be committed notwithstanding; the whole punishment will be inefficacious. The strength of the tempation, ceteris paribus, is as the profit of the offence: the quantum of the punishment must rise must rise with the profit of the offence- therefore, it must rise with the strength of the temptation
Rule 2. The greater the mischief of the offence, the greater is the expense, which it may be worth while to be at, in the way of punishment.
Rule 3. Where two offences come in competition, the punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.
With this is meant, that a man must be induced to choose always the least mischievous of two offences.
Rule 4. The punishment should be adjusted in such manner to each particular offence, that for every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender.
Has a man resolved upon a particular offence, he must be induced to do no more mischief than is necessary for his purpose (applies to our society as well: manslaughter is more than disproportionate when a delinquent allegedly was in search for his victim's wallet).
Rule 5. The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given.
Whatever mischief is guarded against, the object is to guard against it at as cheap rate as possible.
Rule 6. The quantity actually inflicted on each individual offender may correspond to the quantity intented for similar offenders in general, the several circumstances influencing sensibility ought always to be taken into account.
Punishment which is the same in name will not always produce in two persons the same degree of pain. Hence is why all circumstances influencing the sensibility of the offender must be taken into account.
The first four rules set out the limits below which punishment ought not to be diminished; the fifth rule presents the limit above which punishment is ought not to be increased. The sixth rule is intented for guiding the judge.
1. Beccaria
Revolutionair is Beccaria's stelling, dat straf een middel is, waarvan de effectiviteit ter discussie staat. Hoe verhoudt zich nu het argument van Beccaria, dat straf uitsluitend kan worden opgelegd ter speciale of generale preventie, tot de verdragstheorie van Locke?
De vestiging van de Staat is volgens Locke geen doel, maar een middel om de bescherming van 'Property' (Life, Liberty, Estate) te garanderen.
Uit Beccaria's uiteenzetting in Dei delitti e delle pene blijkt, hoezeer hij is geïnspireerd door de theorie van Locke:
"Geen enkel mens heeft een deel van zijn persoonlijke vrijheden afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, zonder een tegenprestatie te eisen. Indien het mogelijk was, zou iedereen zelfs willen, dat de maatschappelijke verplichtingen die wij op ons hebben genomen, wel op anderen drukken, maar niet onszelf niet zouden verbinden. De som van alle kleine deeltjes individuele vrijheid, afgestaan ten gunste van het algemeen welzijn, maakt de soevereiniteit van de natie uit.
Er zijn tastbare middelen nodig om de mens te beletten, de gemeenschap in de vroegere chaotische (natuur)staat terug te storten. Deze middelen zijn de straffen. Er moeten motieven worden geschapen, die rechtstreeks de menselijke sensibiliteit weten te treffen. Alleen de wetten kunnen de straffen bepalen [legaliteitsbeginsel, een novum van de hand van Beccaria]. Dit recht kan niemand anders bezitten dan de wetgever, die de gehele maatschappij, verbonden in het sociaal contract, vertegenwoordigt.
Het is alleen omdat de mensen zich daartoe door omstandigheden genoodzaakt hebben gezien, dat zij een minimaal deel van hun vrijheid als pand aan de gemeenschap hebben gegeven (de burgers zijn niet tot één volk verenigd, als in de latere contractstheorie van Rousseau, maar blijven als individuen met eigen, weliswaar voor een deel opgegeven vrijheidsrechten, naast elkaar leven). De samenbundeling van alle minimale deeltjes maakt het recht tot straffen uit. Alles wat er meer bij komt, is niet gerechtvaardigd." (vert. J.M. Michiels)
De rechtvaardiging van overheidsgezag is dus onlosmakelijk verbonden met het recht tot straffen. Het recht van de soeverein om te straffen reikt niet verder dan de optelsom van de natuurlijke rechten die de mensen hebben overgedragen aan het soeverein gezag. De voorwaardelijkheid van de overdracht van de natuurlijke rechten, maakt duidelijk dat de overheid het recht tot strafoplegging slechts kan aanwenden, om het zelfbehoud van de burgers te beschermen.
Op welke gronden pleit Beccaria voor de gematigdheid van straffen? De eis van de effectiviteit wordt als volgt geformuleerd: "Het leed, dat de straf meebrengt, dient groter te zijn dan het voordeel dat het plegen van het misdrijf oplevert. Tot dit overwicht dient ook de overtuiging bij te dragen, dat men zijn straf niet kan ontlopen, alsook het verlies van de voordelen, die het misdrijf zou hebben meegebracht. Alle strengheid die deze grenzen overschrijdt, is overbodig en daarom tirannie."
Beccaria baseert zijn stelling, dat wrede straffen ineffectief zijn, op zijn observaties: "Hoe wreder de straffen, des te ongevoeliger wordt het menselijk gemoed. De overdreven wreedheid heeft zelfs een contradictoire werking: de delinquent zal een groter risico nemen om zijn straf te ontlopen. Er zullen meerdere delicten worden gepleegd, om de straf voor één enkel vergrijp te ontgaan."
Er wordt gewezen op twee andere nadelen, die het gevolg zijn van overdreven wrede straffen: "In de eerste plaats is het niet eenvoudig, een fundamenteel juiste verhouding te vinden tussen het begane misdrijf en de verdiende straf. Wanneer het uiterste punt van verzadiging is bereikt, is het onmogelijk om voor wandaden die nóg gevaarlijker zijn, een overeenkomstige straf ter preventie te ontwikkelen. Het tweede nadeel is, dat de overdreven wreedheid van de straffen, straffeloosheid met zich brengt. Een te wreed systeem wordt op de lange duur niet meer toegepast, hetgeen erop neerkomt dat de wet zelf de straffeloosheid in de hand werkt."
2. Klassiek utilisme: Bentham (en Mill)
Centraal in de utilistische theorie, zoals deze is ontwikkeld door Jeremy Bentham, staat de opvatting van de geluksmaximalisatie: "Whenever we have a choice between alternative actions or social policies, we must choose the one that has the best overall consequences. The purpose of the law is the same as morals: that is, to promote general welfare of all citizens. The freedom of citizens should not be restricted any more than is necessary. Either approve or disapprove actions that do augment or diminish the happiness of the party in question"
Door John Stuart Mill is het utilisme van Bentham 'verfijnd': Mill maakt een onderscheid in de gradaties van geluk. Het gaat om kwaliteit. Bentham, daarentegen, hanteert slechts een optelsom als maatstaf voor geluk. De essentie van het utilisme van Mill verschilt echter niet van dat van Bentham:
"According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end is an existence exempt as free as possible from pain- and rich in enjoyments."
Welbekend is de volgende passage uit zijn essay 'On Liberty':
"...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others [...] The only part for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. Over himself, his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
Uit dit citaat blijkt impliciet, dat preventie de toepassing van straf rechtvaardigt. Daarbij moet worden opgemerkt, dat Mill niet beoogt om de handelingsvrijheid van de burger, ter voorkoming van schade aan anderen, in algemene zin te beperken. Een dergelijke inbreuk op de autonomie van de burger, is slechts gerechtvaardigd, wanneer de overheid optreedt tegen kinderen en geesteszieken. Deze categorieën moeten tegen zichzelf in bescherming worden genomen.
2.2. Punishment and Deterrence: the aims of punishment
De utilistische rechtvaardiging van straf wordt helder uiteengezet door Bentham in zijn boek 'The Principles of Penal Law'.
Onder paragraaf 2.1(a), 'The Aims of Punishment', presenteert hij de doelen van het strafrecht als volgt:
"When an act has been committed which is followed, or threatens to be followed, two wishes suggest themselves: first, to obviate the danger of the like mischief in future; secondly, to compensate the mischief that has been done. The mischief likely to ensue from acts of the like kind, may arise from either of two sources: the conduct of the party himself who has been the author of the mischief already done, or the conduct of other persons as may have adequate motives and sufficient opportunities to do the like."
"Hence the prevention of offences divises itself into two branches:
Particular prevention, which applies to the delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is applicable to all, without exception."
De volgende passage spitst de karakteristieken van het klassieke utilisme ("pain and pleasure are sovereign" en "subtracting the magnitude of pleasure and the magnitude of pain") van Bentham toe op de preventieve functie van het strafrecht:
"Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner, to withdraw him from that act. If the apparent magnitude of that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude of the pleasure he expects to be the consequence of that act, he will be absolutely prevented from commiting the mischief."
2.3. The Quantum of Punishment
In de optiek van Bentham is preventie het enige legitieme doel van strafrecht (typisch utilisme: straf is geen doel, maar een middel). Hoe kan het strafrecht effectief worden toegepast?
Rule 1. The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence.
If it be, the offence will sure be committed notwithstanding; the whole punishment will be inefficacious. The strength of the tempation, ceteris paribus, is as the profit of the offence: the quantum of the punishment must rise must rise with the profit of the offence- therefore, it must rise with the strength of the temptation
Rule 2. The greater the mischief of the offence, the greater is the expense, which it may be worth while to be at, in the way of punishment.
Rule 3. Where two offences come in competition, the punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.
With this is meant, that a man must be induced to choose always the least mischievous of two offences.
Rule 4. The punishment should be adjusted in such manner to each particular offence, that for every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender.
Has a man resolved upon a particular offence, he must be induced to do no more mischief than is necessary for his purpose (applies to our society as well: manslaughter is more than disproportionate when a delinquent allegedly was in search for his victim's wallet).
Rule 5. The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given.
Whatever mischief is guarded against, the object is to guard against it at as cheap rate as possible.
Rule 6. The quantity actually inflicted on each individual offender may correspond to the quantity intented for similar offenders in general, the several circumstances influencing sensibility ought always to be taken into account.
Punishment which is the same in name will not always produce in two persons the same degree of pain. Hence is why all circumstances influencing the sensibility of the offender must be taken into account.
The first four rules set out the limits below which punishment ought not to be diminished; the fifth rule presents the limit above which punishment is ought not to be increased. The sixth rule is intented for guiding the judge.
woensdag 12 april 2017
Legitimatietheorieën strafecht: Retributivisme (Kant) vs. Utilisme (Beccaria)
Legitimatietheorieën: van talio tot anarchisme
In de Klassieke Wereld werd talio (ius talionis/ lex talionis) als het meest rechtvaardige principe beschouwd: de nadruk lag op de proportionaliteit van de straf tegenover de misdaad. Proportionaliteit wordt in die zin niet bepaald door omstandigheden. De misdaad dient te worden vereffend, "opdat de bloedschuld niet aan het volk blijft kleven".
1.1. Kant: retributivisme
Die opvatting wordt gedeeld door Immanuel Kant. Het door Kant geciteerde principe duidt op eenzelfde proportionaliteitseis die wordt aangetroffen in de Codex Hammurabi (het Babylonische recht). Kant reageert in zijn Metaphysik der Sitten op de moderne utilistische visie van Beccaria. Anders dan de utilisten, stelt Kant dat effectiviteit (het nutsprincipe) de oplegging van straf niet kan rechtvaardigen; straf kan uitsluitend worden opgelegd ter vereffening. De vergelding is inherent aan het retributivisme.
Vanuit de theorie der deontologie beredeneert Kant, dat straf nimmer kan worden opgelegd om één of ander voordeel te behalen; de mens mag niet worden gedegradeerd tot middel om bepaalde doelen te verwezenlijken. Met het introduceren van het gelijkheidsbeginsel wordt de parallel getrokken met het aloude talioprincipe: "..de weegschaal van het recht slaat noch naar de ene, noch naar de andere kant door." Kant vervolgt zijn betoog: "Alleen ius talionis kan de kwaliteit en kwantiteit van een straf precies bepalen. Alle andere beginselen zijn [te] veranderlijk en kunnen [..] niet in overeenstemming zijn met de zuivere gerechtigheid." (Vert. P.C. Westerman)
1.2. Categorische Imperatief in relatie tot vergelding
Kant construeert de koppeling van de vergelding aan het gelijkheidsbeginsel, aan de hand van zijn (dogmatische) Categorische Imperatief:
"Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie allgemeines Gesetz werde."
1. Bij iedere handeling dient men zich af te vragen, welke (morele) regel aan die handeling ten grondslag ligt (Maxime, Ausdruck der Vernunftstrebens nach Einheit und Verallgemeinerung);
2. Vervolgens dient men zich af te vragen, of men wenst dat die regel universeel toegepast wordt.
Werkt een dergelijke universele wet vernietigend, dan dient men af te zien van de handeling. De strikte toepassing van de principes, duidt erop dat Kant een deontoloog bij uitstek is.
Kant acht de delinquent in staat om de Categorische Imperatief toe te passen, omdat ieder mens is begiftigd met verstand. Als rationele persoon accepteert de delinquent de geuniversaliseerde toepassing van zijn eigen 'Maxime'.
1.3. Kritiek op het utilisme van Beccaria
De voornaamste kritiek van Kant op Beccaria, is dat Beccaria geen onderscheid maakt tussen homo phenomenon en homo noumenon. Slechts de redelijke mens, de noumenon, is in staat om een sociaal contract te sluiten. Vgl. Rousseau: zelfwetgeving is slechts mogelijk als men zich niet laat leiden door eigenbelang (homo phenomenon). Overheidsgezag en daarmee het centraal gereguleerde strafrecht, is gelegitimeerd als zij het gevolg is van zelfwetgeving door de rationele mens. Het normatieve element impliceert dat men wordt geacht redelijkerwijs met de uitgevaardigde strafwetten te hebben ingestemd. De 'volonté générale' impliceert dat de homo noumenon, ten behoeve van effectieve vereniging van de burgers tot een volg, zijn belangen ondergeschikt maakt aan het geheel. Alle (vrijheids)rechten zijn overgedragen aan de soeverein, opdat men wilsvrijheid bereikt.
In 'Metafysik der Setten' drukt Kant zijn kritiek op Beccaria als volgt uit: "..Beccaria heeft hiertegen ingebracht, dat zij [ de straf in kwestie ] onrechtmatig zou zijn, omdat zij geen deel zou kunnen uitmaken van het maatschappelijk verdrag, aangezien iedereen dan in had moeten stemmen met de consequenties. [echter:] Ik, als medewetgever, die de strafwet opstelt, kan onmogelijk dezelfde persoon zijn als de onderdaan die door de wet wordt bestraft; als misdadiger kan ik onmogelijk een stem hebben in de wetgeving (de wetgever is heilig)."
De legitieme uitvaardiging en toepassing van het strafrecht moet als volgt worden uitgelegd:
"Dus als ik een strafwet tegen mezelf, als misdadiger, zou uitvaardigen, dan doe ik dat tengevolge van de zuivere wetgevende Rede (homo noumenon), die deel van mij uitmaakt. Deze onderwerpt het deel van mij, tot misdaden in staat (homo phenomenon) aan de strafwetten in de vereniging van burgers [..]. Met andere woorden: niet het volk (als verzameling individuen [volonté de tous] ), maar de openbare gerechtigheid (resultaat volonté générale) legt de straffen op." (vert. P.C. Westerman)
Beccaria stelt daarentegen de 'volonté de tous' voorop. Volgens Beccaria drukt legitiem strafrecht het nastreven van zelfbehoud door de natuurlijke mens (phenomenon) uit. Sommige straffen zijn in deze opvatting nooit gerechtvaardigd, omdat zij conflicteren met dit natuurlijke streven tot zelfbehoud door de homo phenomenon. Deze uiting van eigenbelang komt geenszins overeen met de rationele constructie van Kant, in navolging van Rousseau.
De legitimatietheorie van Beccaria is duidelijk ontleend aan het contractsdenken van Locke: burgers hebben (centraal) soeverein gezag gevestigd bij wijze van de overdracht van minimale gedeelten van hun vrijheden. Het recht van de Staat is de optelsom van de natuurlijke rechten van burgers (volonté de tous als resultaat van de wil van alle individuen). Het normatieve element van de 'volonté générale' ontbreekt. De macht van de soeverein en daarmee het recht tot straffen, wordt ingeperkt, omdat de homo phenomenon zijn vrijheidsrechten niet onvoorwaardelijk en zonder voorbehoud heeft afgestaan.
2. Overzicht: verschillen tussen retributivisme en utilisme
1. In de retributivistische strafrechtstheorie staat vergelding centraal. Volgens het aloude talioprincipe is er ultieme proportionaliteit tussen delict en straf; in tegenstelling tot de moderne perceptie van proportionaliteit, gaat het om een bijna meetkundige symmetrie, die ook werd aangetroffen in de Babylonische strafwetten ('Metaphysik' is niet zonder reden de titel van de klassieker van Kant).
Aangezien volgens het utilisme, de speciale of generale preventie de toepassing van de straf dient te rechtvaardigen, is de proportionaliteit tussen daad en straf van minder groot belang.
2. Met de splitsing tussen homo phenomenon en homo noumenon maken retributivisten duidelijk, dat zij de delinquent in staat achten om rationele beslissingen te nemen. Een ieder is in staat om een overweging te maken; uit dit indeterministische beeld volgt dat de delinquent niet voor het beste alternatief heeft gekozen en op grond daarvan de consequenties heeft willen aanvaarden (vgl. Categorische Imperatief).
Het utilisme past een deterministisch beeld toe. Aangezien de keuzevrijheid van de delinquent is beperkt door bepaalde factoren, is de strafrechtelijke consequentie dat hij moet worden behandeld op een manier die recidive voorkomt.
3. De zwakte van het retributivistische model: een beetje gedetermineerd?
Retributivisten ontkennen niet dat de mens in bepaalde mate is gedetermineerd. Kant kiest duidelijk voor een rationele constructie die binnen zijn theorie past: omdat de mens volgens het retributivisme slechts verantwoordelijk kan worden gehouden als hij keuzevrijheid had én omdat vergelding volgens hem een noodzakelijk kwaad is, kan het niet zo zijn dat de mens volledig wordt gedetermineerd door biologische factoren.
Hier wordt het indeterministische mensbeeld door Kant al enigszins afgezwakt. Hij riskeert daarmee, dat dit beeld niet meer strookt met zijn stelling, 'dat de mens keuzevrijheid had'. Daarom wordt weer het onderscheid tussen de homo phenomenon en noumenon toegepast: de vrije mens, bepaald door zijn natuurlijke factoren, bestaat naast de mens die in staat is om de Rede te gebruiken. In zijn hoedanigheid als homo noumenon is hij niet beperkt en in diezelfde hoedanigheid wordt hij verantwoordelijk gehouden voor zijn handelen.
De achterliggende gedachte is, dat slechts de noumenon, rechtssubject kan zijn. Als homo noumenon, als medewetgever in het sociaal contract, komen aan de mens alle civiele rechten toe. Als noumenon heeft hij zijn rechten volledig heeft overgedragen ten behoeve van bescherming van de volledige wilsvrijheid door de soeverein. De door biologische factoren gedetermineerde mens kan niet dezelfde zijn als deze medewetgever, omdat de wet 'heilig' is.
De mens kan slechts in zijn hoedanigheid van noumenon worden geacht de strafwet bij wijze van zelfwetgeving (via het centrale gezag, vgl. Rousseau), op zichzelf toe te passen. De delinquent moet wel hebben gehandeld als vrije persoon, als noumenon; is dat niet het geval, dan kan de retributivist de oplegging van de straf volgens zijn eigen theorie niet rechtvaardigen. Daarmee is duidelijk wat de zwakte is van de rechtvaardigingstheorie van Kant: de strenge retributivist moet zich in allerlei bochten wringen om de essentie van zijn eigen theorie niet tegen te spreken.
In de Klassieke Wereld werd talio (ius talionis/ lex talionis) als het meest rechtvaardige principe beschouwd: de nadruk lag op de proportionaliteit van de straf tegenover de misdaad. Proportionaliteit wordt in die zin niet bepaald door omstandigheden. De misdaad dient te worden vereffend, "opdat de bloedschuld niet aan het volk blijft kleven".
1.1. Kant: retributivisme
Die opvatting wordt gedeeld door Immanuel Kant. Het door Kant geciteerde principe duidt op eenzelfde proportionaliteitseis die wordt aangetroffen in de Codex Hammurabi (het Babylonische recht). Kant reageert in zijn Metaphysik der Sitten op de moderne utilistische visie van Beccaria. Anders dan de utilisten, stelt Kant dat effectiviteit (het nutsprincipe) de oplegging van straf niet kan rechtvaardigen; straf kan uitsluitend worden opgelegd ter vereffening. De vergelding is inherent aan het retributivisme.
Vanuit de theorie der deontologie beredeneert Kant, dat straf nimmer kan worden opgelegd om één of ander voordeel te behalen; de mens mag niet worden gedegradeerd tot middel om bepaalde doelen te verwezenlijken. Met het introduceren van het gelijkheidsbeginsel wordt de parallel getrokken met het aloude talioprincipe: "..de weegschaal van het recht slaat noch naar de ene, noch naar de andere kant door." Kant vervolgt zijn betoog: "Alleen ius talionis kan de kwaliteit en kwantiteit van een straf precies bepalen. Alle andere beginselen zijn [te] veranderlijk en kunnen [..] niet in overeenstemming zijn met de zuivere gerechtigheid." (Vert. P.C. Westerman)
1.2. Categorische Imperatief in relatie tot vergelding
Kant construeert de koppeling van de vergelding aan het gelijkheidsbeginsel, aan de hand van zijn (dogmatische) Categorische Imperatief:
"Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie allgemeines Gesetz werde."
1. Bij iedere handeling dient men zich af te vragen, welke (morele) regel aan die handeling ten grondslag ligt (Maxime, Ausdruck der Vernunftstrebens nach Einheit und Verallgemeinerung);
2. Vervolgens dient men zich af te vragen, of men wenst dat die regel universeel toegepast wordt.
Werkt een dergelijke universele wet vernietigend, dan dient men af te zien van de handeling. De strikte toepassing van de principes, duidt erop dat Kant een deontoloog bij uitstek is.
Kant acht de delinquent in staat om de Categorische Imperatief toe te passen, omdat ieder mens is begiftigd met verstand. Als rationele persoon accepteert de delinquent de geuniversaliseerde toepassing van zijn eigen 'Maxime'.
1.3. Kritiek op het utilisme van Beccaria
De voornaamste kritiek van Kant op Beccaria, is dat Beccaria geen onderscheid maakt tussen homo phenomenon en homo noumenon. Slechts de redelijke mens, de noumenon, is in staat om een sociaal contract te sluiten. Vgl. Rousseau: zelfwetgeving is slechts mogelijk als men zich niet laat leiden door eigenbelang (homo phenomenon). Overheidsgezag en daarmee het centraal gereguleerde strafrecht, is gelegitimeerd als zij het gevolg is van zelfwetgeving door de rationele mens. Het normatieve element impliceert dat men wordt geacht redelijkerwijs met de uitgevaardigde strafwetten te hebben ingestemd. De 'volonté générale' impliceert dat de homo noumenon, ten behoeve van effectieve vereniging van de burgers tot een volg, zijn belangen ondergeschikt maakt aan het geheel. Alle (vrijheids)rechten zijn overgedragen aan de soeverein, opdat men wilsvrijheid bereikt.
In 'Metafysik der Setten' drukt Kant zijn kritiek op Beccaria als volgt uit: "..Beccaria heeft hiertegen ingebracht, dat zij [ de straf in kwestie ] onrechtmatig zou zijn, omdat zij geen deel zou kunnen uitmaken van het maatschappelijk verdrag, aangezien iedereen dan in had moeten stemmen met de consequenties. [echter:] Ik, als medewetgever, die de strafwet opstelt, kan onmogelijk dezelfde persoon zijn als de onderdaan die door de wet wordt bestraft; als misdadiger kan ik onmogelijk een stem hebben in de wetgeving (de wetgever is heilig)."
De legitieme uitvaardiging en toepassing van het strafrecht moet als volgt worden uitgelegd:
"Dus als ik een strafwet tegen mezelf, als misdadiger, zou uitvaardigen, dan doe ik dat tengevolge van de zuivere wetgevende Rede (homo noumenon), die deel van mij uitmaakt. Deze onderwerpt het deel van mij, tot misdaden in staat (homo phenomenon) aan de strafwetten in de vereniging van burgers [..]. Met andere woorden: niet het volk (als verzameling individuen [volonté de tous] ), maar de openbare gerechtigheid (resultaat volonté générale) legt de straffen op." (vert. P.C. Westerman)
Beccaria stelt daarentegen de 'volonté de tous' voorop. Volgens Beccaria drukt legitiem strafrecht het nastreven van zelfbehoud door de natuurlijke mens (phenomenon) uit. Sommige straffen zijn in deze opvatting nooit gerechtvaardigd, omdat zij conflicteren met dit natuurlijke streven tot zelfbehoud door de homo phenomenon. Deze uiting van eigenbelang komt geenszins overeen met de rationele constructie van Kant, in navolging van Rousseau.
De legitimatietheorie van Beccaria is duidelijk ontleend aan het contractsdenken van Locke: burgers hebben (centraal) soeverein gezag gevestigd bij wijze van de overdracht van minimale gedeelten van hun vrijheden. Het recht van de Staat is de optelsom van de natuurlijke rechten van burgers (volonté de tous als resultaat van de wil van alle individuen). Het normatieve element van de 'volonté générale' ontbreekt. De macht van de soeverein en daarmee het recht tot straffen, wordt ingeperkt, omdat de homo phenomenon zijn vrijheidsrechten niet onvoorwaardelijk en zonder voorbehoud heeft afgestaan.
2. Overzicht: verschillen tussen retributivisme en utilisme
1. In de retributivistische strafrechtstheorie staat vergelding centraal. Volgens het aloude talioprincipe is er ultieme proportionaliteit tussen delict en straf; in tegenstelling tot de moderne perceptie van proportionaliteit, gaat het om een bijna meetkundige symmetrie, die ook werd aangetroffen in de Babylonische strafwetten ('Metaphysik' is niet zonder reden de titel van de klassieker van Kant).
Aangezien volgens het utilisme, de speciale of generale preventie de toepassing van de straf dient te rechtvaardigen, is de proportionaliteit tussen daad en straf van minder groot belang.
2. Met de splitsing tussen homo phenomenon en homo noumenon maken retributivisten duidelijk, dat zij de delinquent in staat achten om rationele beslissingen te nemen. Een ieder is in staat om een overweging te maken; uit dit indeterministische beeld volgt dat de delinquent niet voor het beste alternatief heeft gekozen en op grond daarvan de consequenties heeft willen aanvaarden (vgl. Categorische Imperatief).
Het utilisme past een deterministisch beeld toe. Aangezien de keuzevrijheid van de delinquent is beperkt door bepaalde factoren, is de strafrechtelijke consequentie dat hij moet worden behandeld op een manier die recidive voorkomt.
3. De zwakte van het retributivistische model: een beetje gedetermineerd?
Retributivisten ontkennen niet dat de mens in bepaalde mate is gedetermineerd. Kant kiest duidelijk voor een rationele constructie die binnen zijn theorie past: omdat de mens volgens het retributivisme slechts verantwoordelijk kan worden gehouden als hij keuzevrijheid had én omdat vergelding volgens hem een noodzakelijk kwaad is, kan het niet zo zijn dat de mens volledig wordt gedetermineerd door biologische factoren.
Hier wordt het indeterministische mensbeeld door Kant al enigszins afgezwakt. Hij riskeert daarmee, dat dit beeld niet meer strookt met zijn stelling, 'dat de mens keuzevrijheid had'. Daarom wordt weer het onderscheid tussen de homo phenomenon en noumenon toegepast: de vrije mens, bepaald door zijn natuurlijke factoren, bestaat naast de mens die in staat is om de Rede te gebruiken. In zijn hoedanigheid als homo noumenon is hij niet beperkt en in diezelfde hoedanigheid wordt hij verantwoordelijk gehouden voor zijn handelen.
De achterliggende gedachte is, dat slechts de noumenon, rechtssubject kan zijn. Als homo noumenon, als medewetgever in het sociaal contract, komen aan de mens alle civiele rechten toe. Als noumenon heeft hij zijn rechten volledig heeft overgedragen ten behoeve van bescherming van de volledige wilsvrijheid door de soeverein. De door biologische factoren gedetermineerde mens kan niet dezelfde zijn als deze medewetgever, omdat de wet 'heilig' is.
De mens kan slechts in zijn hoedanigheid van noumenon worden geacht de strafwet bij wijze van zelfwetgeving (via het centrale gezag, vgl. Rousseau), op zichzelf toe te passen. De delinquent moet wel hebben gehandeld als vrije persoon, als noumenon; is dat niet het geval, dan kan de retributivist de oplegging van de straf volgens zijn eigen theorie niet rechtvaardigen. Daarmee is duidelijk wat de zwakte is van de rechtvaardigingstheorie van Kant: de strenge retributivist moet zich in allerlei bochten wringen om de essentie van zijn eigen theorie niet tegen te spreken.
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